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IS THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT SUCCEEDING?
AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE
R. POLK WAGNER†
LEE PETHERBRIDGE††
As an appellate body jurisdictionally demarcated by subject matter rather than
geography, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit occupies a
unique role in the federal judiciary.  This controversial institutional design has
profoundly affected the jurisprudential development of legal regimes within its pur-
view—especially in patent law, which the Federal Circuit has come to thoroughly
dominate in its two decades of existence.
In this Article, we assess the court’s performance against its basic premise:
that, compared to prior regional circuit involvement, centralization of legal author-
ity in the Federal Circuit will yield a clearer, more coherent, and more predictable
legal infrastructure for patent law.  Using empirical data obtained from a novel
study of the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence of claim construction—the interpreta-
tion of language defining a patent’s scope—we conclude that, on this indicator at
least, the result has been decidedly mixed, although there are some encouraging
signs.
Specifically, the study indicates that the Federal Circuit is sharply divided be-
tween two basic methodological approaches to claim construction, each of which
leads to distinct results.  The dominant analytic framework gained additional fa-
vor during the period of the study, and yet the court became increasingly polarized.
We also find that the significantly different approaches to claim construction fol-
lowed by individual Federal Circuit judges has led to panel dependency; claim con-
struction analysis is clearly affected by the composition of the three-judge panel that
hears and decides the case.
While little in the results of this study would lead one to conclude that the
court has been an unqualified success, we believe that the picture of the Federal
Circuit that emerges is of a court in broad transition.  Driven in part by new ap-
pointments and an effort to respond to its special mandate, a new Federal Circuit
is emerging—one that appears to be more rules-driven and more consistent than be-
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fore.  It is too early to be sure, but the findings here, perhaps bolstered by the proce-
dural and jurisprudential reform suggestions we derived from the results, suggest
that the Federal Circuit’s unique position in the judiciary may yet be vindicated.
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INTRODUCTION
In the last two decades,1 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit has become, by far, the most powerful and influen-
tial force in the U.S. patent system.2  The significance of this develop-
ment is impossible to overstate:  even as the patent system has grown
in economic importance,3 technological complexity,4 and public
awareness, the administration of the entire enterprise increasingly de-
pends upon the twelve active judges of the Federal Circuit.5
1
The Federal Circuit was created by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.).
2
This fact is widely acknowledged.  See, e.g., Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of
the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 387, 387 (“The Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit . . . has become the de facto supreme court of patents.”).
3
See generally FRED WARSHOFSKY, THE PATENT WARS:  THE BATTLE TO OWN THE
WORLD’S TECHNOLOGY (1994) (noting the critical nature of patents in economic de-
velopment).
4
See, e.g., John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the United
States Patent System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77, 79 (2002) (“By almost any measure . . . the pat-
ents issued in the late 1990s are more complex than those issued in the 1970s.”).
5
See 28 U.S.C. § 44(a) (2000) (authorizing up to twelve judges).  As of January
2004, all seats are filled.  Of the current judges, two have advanced degrees in scientific
fields ( Judges Newman and Lourie both hold Ph.D.s in Chemistry), four have profes-
sional patent-related experience (Judges Newman, Lourie, Gajarsa, and Linn), three
have policy-legislative experience (Judges Michel, Rader, and Prost), and two have ad-
vanced degrees in economics or business ( Judges Gajarsa and Prost).  See U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Judicial Biographies, at http://www.fedcir.gov/
judgbios.html (last modified Jan. 22, 2004).
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Conferring such dominating power on the Federal Circuit has
long been justified by the premise that this centralization of legal
authority will yield a clearer, more coherent, more predictable legal
infrastructure for the patent system.  Indeed, as a response to wide-
spread dissatisfaction due to confusion and uncertainty under the de-
centralized administration of the patent law, the Federal Circuit was
created to play this very role.6  And since its inception, the court—with
some assistance from the Supreme Court7—has moved aggressively in
support of its widely perceived mandate.8
This mandate gives rise to the obvious (yet surprisingly ephem-
eral) question concerning the Federal Circuit’s role in the patent
system:  is it succeeding?  Has the mandate been fulfilled?  Has this
grand experiment in allocating judicial authority resulted in clearer,
more consistent, more coherent rules surrounding patents?9  This is a
6
See  S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 14-16 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 14-15
(stating that the creation of a centralized court to hear suits related to patents will pro-
vide doctrinal stability in the field of patent law, which will decrease unnecessary un-
certainties in the patent system and thereby increase innovation); COMM’N ON
REVISION OF THE FED. COURT APPELLATE SYS., STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE (1975), reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 195, 220 (1975) (“The
additional appellate capacity for nationally binding decisions which a national court of
appeals would provide can be expected to fulfill [the monitoring] function [over the
complex area of patent law and policy].”).  Perhaps the seminal work considering the
formation of the Federal Circuit and its theoretical basis is Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss,
The Federal Circuit:  A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989).
7
Note in particular the Supreme Court’s decision in Markman v. Westview Instru-
ments, Inc. (Markman II ), 517 U.S. 370, 388-90 (1996), allocating the authority to inter-
pret patent claims to judges.  The importance of Markman II is explored at length
below.  Infra Part I.
8
The decisions in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman I ), 52 F.3d 967
(Fed. Cir. 1995), and Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir.
1998), are especially relevant in this context, as we discuss below.  Infra Part I.
We note, however, that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vor-
nado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 834 (2002), holding that permissive
counterclaims arising under the patent law do not trigger Federal Circuit appellate
jurisdiction, may represent a shift in that Court’s thinking by at least raising the possi-
bility of patent decisions being made by bodies other than the Federal Circuit.
9
We analyze the implementation of these goals (i.e., those expressed in the legis-
lative proceedings surrounding the creation of the Federal Circuit) on their own
terms, rather than analyze whether they are ultimately socially beneficial.  Several
commentators have argued that uncertainty with respect to at least some aspects of the
patent system might be useful.  See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’
Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives:  The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty
and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985, 986 (1999) (“The combination of
[uncertainty and delay in patent litigation] might induce a limited amount of in-
fringement that enhances social welfare . . . .”); Howard F. Chang, Patent Scope, Anti-
trust Policy, and Cumulative Innovation, 26 RAND J. ECON. 34, 50-51 (1995) (arguing that
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question to which scholars,10 the bar,11 and even judges12 are now turn-
ing with increasing interest—a reconsideration of the institutional
courts could achieve optimal incentive for successive innovations by implementing a
randomized policy that delivered to patentees, on average, the correct payoff for an
innovation’s actual social value in light of subsequent innovations); Jerry R. Green &
Suzanne Scotchmer, On the Division of Profit in Sequential Innovation, 26 RAND J. ECON.
20, 21-22 (1995) (arguing that patent scope should be varied for successive innovations
to ensure that each innovator is appropriately incentivized); Suzanne Scotchmer,
Standing on the Shoulders of Giants:  Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON.
PERSP. 29, 35-36 (1991) (noting that uncertainty in the scope of patent protection may
create incentives encouraging the development of new products); see also infra Part
III.D.4 and note 180 (discussing the uncertainty that results from panel dependency).
Analyzing whether the goals of the Federal Circuit are themselves worthy is a question
beyond the scope of this Article.  However, for a discussion of some underlying diffi-
culties surrounding the goals of the Federal Circuit, see Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and
Policy:  A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035,
1037-38 (2003).
10
See, e.g., Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construc-
tion Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1078-79 (2001) (suggesting the Federal Cir-
cuit has failed to achieve greater predictability); John F. Duffy, On Improving the Legal
Process of Claim Interpretation:  Administrative Alternatives, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 109
(2000) (considering future innovations in claim interpretation that might solve proce-
dural inefficiencies inherent in the current system of consolidated Federal Circuit re-
view of patent appeals); Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW.
U. L. REV. 1495, 1496 (2001) (asserting that a more intensive patent evaluation process
is unwarranted); Craig Allen Nard, Process Considerations in the Age of Markman and
Mantras, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 355, 357 (2001) [hereinafter Nard, Process Considerations]
(calling for the Federal Circuit to accept interlocutory appeals of district court claim
interpretations in order to promote certainty); Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim In-
terpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 82 (2000) [hereinafter Nard, Claim Interpretation]
(contending that the Federal Circuit uses a theory of claim construction called “hyper-
textualism” and concluding that it is responsible for the court’s failure to achieve cer-
tainty and coherence in its jurisprudence); Rai, supra note 9, at 1040 (arguing that the
Federal Circuit has arrogated power over fact finding to the detriment of the patent
system); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research:  Intellectual Property Rights and the
Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 79 (1999) (asserting that legal change has been
out of step with the “instrumental goals of intellectual property”).
11
The views of the bar are noted by various authors, e.g., Luke L. Dauchot, The
Federal Circuit’s De Novo Review of Patent Claim Construction:  A Need for a More Balanced
Approach, 18 INTELL. PROP. L. NEWSL. (Am. Bar. Ass’n Sec. on Intell. Prop., Chicago,
Ill.), Fall 1999, at 1, 1 (arguing for the Federal Circuit to give greater deference to trial
court interpretations); Ted D. Lee & Michelle Evans, The Charade:  Trying a Patent Case
to All “Three” Juries, 8 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 11-20 (1999) (characterizing the Fed-
eral Circuit as a “second jury” in patent cases); Paul R. Michel, The Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit Must Evolve to Meet the Challenges Ahead, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1177, 1186-
1200 (1999) (addressing oft-cited practitioner concerns); Douglas D. Salyers, The Paper
Side of Jury Litigation in Patent Cases—Don’t Become Just Another Statistic in The Federal Cir-
cuit, in PATENT LITIGATION 1999, at 557, 566-88 (PLI Intell. Prop. Course, Handbook
Series No. G-572, 1999).
12
The reported opinions of judges, other than those on the Federal Circuit, have
been largely negative.  One district court judge has stated publicly that the Federal
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design of the patent system.13  Yet the analysis of its design requires
careful evaluation, and most of this literature, while often illuminat-
ing, has not been empirically grounded.14
This Article provides important insights into this question by pre-
senting the results of a novel empirical study of judicial performance.
The findings suggest that the Federal Circuit is a court in a period of
significant transition—one driven by an ongoing effort to meet the
requirements of its special mandate and by important changes in
court personnel.  The Federal Circuit has perhaps not yet succeeded
in fulfilling its mandate, though the present trajectory of its jurispru-
dence holds out the promise that it ultimately will do so.
Our contribution to the debate surrounding the efficacy of the
patent administration system offers two features that do not presently
exist in the contemporary literature.  First, the analysis is systematic
and empirical, synthesizing all relevant judicial pronouncements
across the approximately seven-year time period of the study, rather
than using scattered or individual case results.15  Second, the study fo-
cuses squarely on the methodological approach of the Federal Circuit,
Circuit is full of “little green men who don’t know Tuesday from Philadelphia.”  Victo-
ria Slind-Flor, The Markman Prophecies, IP WORLDWIDE, March 13, 2002, at 28, 30
(quoting Judge Samuel Kent of the Southern District of Texas); see also id. (“‘Frankly, I
don’t know why I’m so excited about bringing this [patent case] to closure.  It goes to
the Federal Circuit afterwards.  You know, it’s hard to deal with things that are ulti-
mately resolved by people wearing propeller hats.’” (quoting Judge Kent in O.I. Corp.
v. Tekmar Co., No. 95-CV-113 (S.D. Tex. June 17, 1996))).
13
Note also that everyone seems to agree (without much discussion) that patents
have become, on balance, more valuable assets under the Federal Circuit’s tutelage.
See, e.g., DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 33-34 (2d ed. 2001).
But strength or scope, of course, is not the same as consistency; it is entirely possible
that the Federal Circuit has increased the “mean” strength of a patent (its likelihood of
being upheld, its enforceable scope, etc.), while maintaining the earlier variance and
unpredictability in outcomes.
14
There are, however, several notable examples of empirical studies on this sub-
ject, such as Chu, supra note 10; Lemley, supra note 10; Kimberly A. Moore, Are District
Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2001).
15
There is, of course, absolutely nothing wrong with doctrinal analysis using se-
lected (i.e., important or symbolic) judicial opinions.  Our point is to note that the sys-
tematic nature of this study offers insights that are not captured by the literature.
Prior analyses of the Federal Circuit’s approach to claim construction include: Duffy,
supra note 10; Nard, Process Considerations, supra note 10; Nard, Claim Interpretation, su-
pra note 10; Rai, supra note 9; Rai, supra note 10; John M. Romary & Arie M. Michel-
sohn, Patent Claim Interpretation After Markman:  How the Federal Circuit Interprets Claims,
46 AM. U. L. REV. 1887 (1997); John R. Thomas, Of Text, Technique, and the Tangible:
Drafting Patent Claims Around Patent Rules, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 219
(1998); Gwendolyn Dawson, Note, Matchmaking in the Realm of Patents:  A Call for the
Marriage of Patent Theory and Claim Construction Procedure, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1257 (2001).
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rather than simply counting appellate results (i.e., reversal rates).16  By
looking (a) systematically and (b) at the expressed methodological
approach, this study offers an unprecedented opportunity to evaluate
the success of the court in its role as the arbiter of the patent law.
The study reported here analyzes the Federal Circuit’s recent ju-
risprudence of claim construction—the interpretation of language de-
fining a patent’s scope—as a window into judicial performance.17
Specifically, the study analyzed the court’s methodological approach
to claim construction in all written opinions since the April 1996 Su-
preme Court opinion in Markman II 18 using a specially developed case-
coding technique that captured both general methodology and the
strength of its form.  The collected data was used to conduct descrip-
tive statistical analyses, which revealed the Federal Circuit’s overall
methodological approaches, discernible trends over time, and the
methodology of the court’s judges on an individual basis.
The data reveals a sharp division within the court between two dis-
tinct methodological approaches (which we term “procedural” and
“holistic,” respectively), each of which leads to distinct results.19  Spe-
cifically, we find that the Federal Circuit utilized the procedural ap-
proach in 63% of the cases and the holistic approach in the remaining
37%.  During the time period of our study, the procedural approach
gained favor with the court in a gradual, though statistically sig-
nificant, fashion.  We also find that the Federal Circuit’s jurisprud-
ence became increasingly polarized during this time, with a significant
16
For examples of such studies, see Chu, supra note 10; Moore, supra note 10.  As
Part I notes in more detail, such result-studies, while descriptively quite valuable, do
not allow many conclusions to be drawn concerning the judicial approach taken by the
Federal Circuit.
17
Claim construction is a uniquely appropriate doctrine for this sort of analysis, in
particular because this area is where the court’s mandate for uniformity and predict-
ability is at its most explicit and broadly recognized.  Infra Part I.
18
517 U.S. 370 (1996).
19
The procedural approach is characterized by adherence to a relatively strict
rules-based hierarchy of interpretive sources, with a particular emphasis on the ordi-
nary meaning of disputed patent claim language.  The holistic approach is a far less
structured analysis, utilizing the array of possible interpretive information in a flexible,
case-specific fashion.  Infra Part II.B.
These dichotomous categories were developed through an analysis of the juris-
prudence itself, which reveals that the form of methodological approach uniformly
drives disputes over claim construction (though we are the first to formally define the
dueling analytic methods).  The data suggests that differences in methodological ap-
proach underlie both Federal Circuit reversals of district court claim constructions as
well as dissenting and concurring opinions produced by members of the court itself.
Infra Part II.E.3.
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increase in the use of “strong” forms of each methodological ap-
proach.20  These trends can be attributed, we believe, to increased ac-
tivity among judges who typically author strong methodological
opinions, as well as to the appointment of two strongly Proceduralist
judges ( Judges Linn and Dyk) to the court in 2000.
Our findings also indicate that claim construction at the Federal
Circuit is panel dependent.21  That is, the data reveals that the compo-
sition of the panel that hears and decides an appeal has a statistically
significant effect on the claim construction analysis.  Specifically, we
find that individual judges vary widely in their methodological ap-
proach to claim construction,22 and that the distribution of the judges
allows useful classification into three groups:  the “Proceduralists”
(i.e., those preferring procedural analyses), the “Holistics” (i.e., those
preferring holistic analyses), and a middle group, the “Swing Judges.”
Panel participation by members of both the Proceduralist and Holistic
groups is statistically related to the form of claim construction analy-
sis.23  In addition, the differential odds of a particular methodological
approach can be calculated with 95% statistical significance for half
(i.e., six) of the currently active Federal Circuit judges.24
The totality of these results adds substantially to the contemporary
analysis of the patent administration system—as well as offers un-
precedented tools for the analysis of patent claims, patent disputes,
and (especially) appellate proceedings at the Federal Circuit.  Institu-
tionally, the Federal Circuit appears to be a court in the midst of
broad transition, especially in terms of personnel.  The “new” Federal
Circuit that is now emerging—a court that is more rules-based and
consistent—is already having a measurable impact on patent jurispru-
dence.
The findings also suggest a number of policy implications for the
court’s efforts to meet its mandate.  We recommend that the court
recognize the importance of methodology and move to standardize
20
These parallel trends—a gradual change in methodological approach and in-
creasing polarization—are likely to account for the high reversal rates found by other
studies, see Chu, supra note 10; Moore, supra note 14, as well as the sense of concern
among court observers, see supra notes 10-12.
21
Panel dependency is a frequent criticism of the Federal Circuit—a critique that
is consistently refuted by the judges themselves.  Infra Part III.D.
22
As authors, the judges utilize the holistic methodological approach in a fre-
quency range from 7.1% to 69.0%.  Infra  Part III.C.
23
Infra Part III.D.
24
The remaining judges have no statistically significant effect on the claim con-
struction analysis.  Infra Part III.D.1.
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the procedural methodological approach—the evidence suggests that
the procedural approach is inherently more consistent than holistic
analyses.  Individual judges also have an important role to play in en-
forcement and evangelism.
In our view, whether the Federal Circuit is succeeding is a ques-
tion that remains remarkably open.  Little in these results would lead
one to conclude that the court has been an unqualified success in
bringing additional consistency, uniformity, and predictability to the
patent law.  But at the same time, many findings are unquestionably
encouraging, suggesting that the court’s effort to meet its mandate is
both well underway and moving in the right direction.
This Article has four main parts.  Part I sets forth the doctrinal
and theoretical background of the Federal Circuit and its special
mandate in the area of the patent law:  an institutional framework that
requires the court to develop its jurisprudence in a clear, coherent,
and predictable manner.  This mandate is particularly relevant in the
area of claim construction, where characteristics of the analysis and
policy-laden determinations by both the Supreme Court and the Fed-
eral Circuit fundamentally require jurisprudential consistency.  This,
in turn, suggests that claim construction is perhaps the best possible
locus of inquiry into the success or failure of the court in achieving its
mission.
The design of the study is set forth in detail in Part II, which de-
scribes the research methods used, including the development of the
case-coding instrument, the selection of the case population, and the
coding techniques.
In Part III, the results are presented, consisting of four basic in-
quiries.  The first is the overall response of the court to the Markman
II  mandate, measuring the total content of the relevant jurisprudence.
The second analytic section reviews trends during the period of the
study and considers which factors may be driving the observed
changes.  A third section reports the methodological approach of in-
dividual Federal Circuit judges, describes the analytical camps or fac-
tions that exist among the judges, and ranks the judges according to
consistency in methodological approach.  The judge-based informa-
tion is used in the fourth section to demonstrate the panel depend-
ency in claim construction at the Federal Circuit, both in terms of the
judge groups developed above and in terms of the individual judges
themselves.  Finally, policy implications and proposed reforms are de-
scribed in Part IV.
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I.  DESIGNING THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT:  A DOCTRINAL AND
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
By now, it is widely recognized that the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit has firmly placed its imprimatur on the
administration of the United States patent system.  With impressive
speed and agility, this court, in two decades, has gone from creation to
domination—broadening, strengthening, and shaping the patent law
in innumerable ways.  Of course, power and recognition foster con-
troversy and criticism; indeed, the persistent questions concerning the
ultimate success of the legal centralization embodied in the Federal
Circuit are what inspire this work.
Section A provides the foundation for the study.  It describes the
basic premise behind Congress’s creation of the Federal Circuit—the
expectation that the centralization of legal authority would yield a
more effective development of the patent law.  As the following pages
describe, this mandate for clarity, coherence, and predictability is
perhaps at its strongest in the particular doctrinal area of claim con-
struction—the process of interpreting patent claim language.  This
special mandate provides a compelling opportunity to evaluate the
Federal Circuit directly—on its own terms, in its efforts to meet the
expectations that produced it.
A.  The Theory of the Federal Circuit
We start from the premise that the important story to be told
about the rise of the Federal Circuit is not one of accident, incompe-
tence, or judicial tyranny—though at least some commentators sug-
gest as much25—but of calculated institutional design refined over two
decades.26  There is little doubt about what Congress believed it was
doing when it passed the Federal Courts Improvement Act (FCIA) in
25
See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 208-10 (2001) (criticizing the
Federal Circuit for broadening the scope and subject matter of patents without
authorization); Declan McCullagh, Left Gets Nod from Right on Copyright Law, CNET
NEWS.COM (Nov. 20, 2002), at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-966595.html (“‘A spe-
cialized court tends to see itself as a booster of its specialty. . . . Patents are clogging
retail commerce on the Internet, and software (patents) in particular are apparently
impediments to software development.’” (quoting Judge Richard Posner)); see also Rai,
supra note 9, at 1035-65 (arguing that the present institutional design is substantially
flawed).
26
See, e.g., Rai, supra note 9, at 1038 n.4 (noting the conscious choice of the Fed-
eral Circuit as the key legal player in the patent system).
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1982,27 establishing the Federal Circuit and designating that court as
the exclusive venue for patent appeals, whether from decisions of the
U.S. District Courts or the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).
Unifying appellate jurisdiction under a single court was seen as an ef-
fective, albeit untested,28 response to the widespread perception that
the legal infrastructure of patent law was not being effectively man-
aged.  Congress was presented with reports demonstrating that the
PTO was essentially “freelancing” with respect to the standards of pat-
entability, resulting in an increasing divergence in the legal frame-
work applied by the judiciary and the PTO and an erosion of the
statutory presumption of validity that attached to patents upon issue.29
Perhaps even more important was the perception that patent cases re-
ceived quite distinct treatment throughout the regional circuits, yield-
ing confusion about the ability to enforce patent rights, as well as
rampant forum shopping (and related litigation).30  For its part, the
Supreme Court had shown little interest in managing the patent law—
probably because of increasing demands on its docket and a general
perception by the judiciary that patent cases were particularly trouble-
some or difficult.31
Thus, from its inception, the Federal Circuit’s exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over the patent law32 has been based on the following line
27
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
28
See Dreyfuss, supra note 6, at 3 (describing FCIA as “a sustained experiment in
specialization”).
29
See id. at 6 (“Since [the PTO] . . . was free to develop its own notions of patent-
ability but could not impose them on other federal courts, its decisions did not com-
mand the respect of the judiciary.”).
30
See  Charles W. Adams, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit:  More than a Na-
tional Patent Court, 49 MO. L. REV. 43, 55-57 (1984) (noting the regional circuits’ dispa-
rate standards for patentability); Dreyfuss, supra note 6, at 6-7 (describing the problems
with regional circuit review).
31
See Adams, supra note 30, at 45 (“With an increasing volume of petitions for cer-
tiorari, the Supreme Court is less able to resolve conflicts between the circuits.”); Drey-
fuss, supra note 6, at 6 (“Perhaps because of its own docket problems and its lack of
expertise, the Supreme Court rarely reviewed the patent law decisions of the regional
circuits.”).
32
The Federal Circuit has also been assigned jurisdiction over appeals in a num-
ber of other substantive areas, including trademarks, international trade, government
contracts, federal claims, and federal civil service disputes.  28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2000).
Indeed, Congress made it clear that it did not consider the court to be “specialized”
due to the diversity of its assigned subject matter.  See H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 19
(1981) (“The proposed new court is not a ‘specialized court.’  Its jurisdiction is not
limited to one type of case, or even to two or three types of cases.  Rather, it has a var-
ied docket spanning a broad range of legal issues and types of cases.”).
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of reasoning:  (1) the court, in its centralized role, would act as the
manager and developer of the patent law,33 and (2) the imposition of
such a structure would yield a clearer, more coherent, and more pre-
dictable patent doctrine, reduce or eliminate forum shopping, and at
least rationalize—if not strengthen—the patent grant.34
While the ultimate success of this foray into centralized judicial
authority for the patent law is uncertain (and, indeed, the subject of
this Article), Congress’s structural goals certainly seem to have been
realized.  There is little doubt that the Federal Circuit has moved
briskly into its role as the manager and developer of the patent doc-
trine.35  Professor Dreyfuss, in a survey of the Federal Circuit’s early
development, noted that the court seized the jurisprudential initiative
in a number of areas, including the standard for obviousness, the
availability of remedies, and procedural issues, though her conclu-
sions regarding the success of these efforts were mixed.36  It is widely
perceived that patents are more valuable today than before 1982,37
and, given the appellate structure, the results in any case are not af-
fected by the regional circuit of origin.  In short, the institutional de-
sign envisioned by Congress has been realized:  the Federal Circuit
has, in a variety of doctrinal areas, assumed its central management
33
See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20-23 (1981) (detailing the court’s primary
role in increasing uniformity in patent law); see also Adams, supra note 30, at 62 (assert-
ing that the FCIA “has enhanced uniformity in patent law by providing a central forum
for deciding patent appeals”); Dreyfuss, supra note 6, at 7 (noting that FCIA attempted
to resolve the problems of PTO arbitrariness and divergence of law across regional cir-
cuits “by creating a single forum to hear appeals from most patent disputes”).
34
See H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20-23 (1981) (predicting these benefits with the
advent of the new court); S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 5 (1981), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15 (expecting that the new court would “increase doctrinal stability”
and “produce desirable uniformity” in patent law); see also Adams, supra note 30, at 62
(stating that, through greater uniformity in patent law, the FCIA “thus has decreased
the incentive for litigants to engage in forum shopping”); Dreyfuss, supra note 6, at 5-7
(“According to proponents of [FCIA], channelling patent cases into a single appellate
forum would create a stable, uniform law and would eliminate forum shopping.
Greater certainty and predictability would foster technological growth and industrial
innovation and would facilitate business planning.”).
35
See Janis, supra note 2, at 402 (noting that the Federal Circuit has an effective
“monopoly over substantive patent law adjudication” since its creation in 1982).
36
Dreyfuss, supra note 6, at 7-22.
37
See CHISUM, supra note 13, at 24 (“The [Federal Circuit] ushered in a new ap-
proach to patent validity and defenses to infringement, resulting in a significant
strengthening of the patent grant[’s value] . . . .”); see also Michael J. Meurer, Control-
ling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509,
519 (2003) (“[I]ntellectual property has become more valuable, and the number of
patents, copyrights, and trademarks has increased rapidly.”).
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role.  Whether the court has been successful in implementing this role
to achieve the expected results underlying the Congressional action
remains, of course, an open question.
B.  The Special Mandate of Claim Construction
The Federal Circuit’s mandate to develop patent doctrine in ways
that promote clarity, coherence, and predictability is perhaps at its
most powerful in the context of the court’s claim construction juris-
prudence.  In addition to the general premise of legal centralization
described above, several features of claim construction make this area
of the law an especially important test for the Federal Circuit.  In par-
ticular, we note below that the Supreme Court’s decision in Markman
II 38 is best understood not merely for its allocation-of-authority princi-
ples, but for its prescriptive aspect, which was clearly directed at the
Federal Circuit.  This directive required that the jurisprudence of
claim construction be developed to provide parties and (especially)
district courts with the necessary tools to perform this complex analy-
sis.  As set forth below, this makes claim construction an especially apt
doctrinal window through which to observe the performance of the
Federal Circuit.  But first, we briefly detour into a description of the
essential features of the modern claim construction system.  Readers
familiar with this aspect of modern patent law may wish to skip the fol-
lowing subsection.
1.  A (Brief) Primer on Claim Construction
Patent claims are, put simply, the textual description of what a
patentee “claims” as her patented invention.39  They establish the basic
boundaries of the patentee’s right to exclude others from the market-
place and also determine whether the patentee receives a patent at all.
As Judge Giles Rich once famously noted, in patent law, “the name of
the game is the claim.”40
Claim “construction” or “interpretation,” then, is the process of
placing the language found in the claims into a meaningful context,
38
517 U.S. 370 (1996).
39
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
40
Giles S. Rich, Extent of Protection and Interpretation of Claims—American Perspectives,
21 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499 (1990) (“The U.S. is strictly an
examination country and the main purpose of the examination, to which every appli-
cation is subjected, is to try to make sure that what each claim defines is patentable.
To coin a phrase, the name of the game is the claim.”).
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given the circumstances.  Sometimes claim language will be unexpect-
edly vague—for example, does the term “coupled” require a physical
connection?41  On other occasions, the language is intentionally diffi-
cult—how flat is “generally flat”?42  In either case, the patent law’s sys-
tem of claim construction analysis guides the inquiry.
It is important to note that claim construction is undertaken by a
variety of public and private actors.  For example, the PTO necessarily
interprets claim language when evaluating the patentability of an in-
vention.43  Private parties are constantly interpreting patent claim lan-
guage as well, either as an evaluation of potential infringement risk,
the determination of the value of a licensing agreement, or as part of
an investment decision.  But the really important claim interpretations
are those conducted by the courts, usually during infringement pro-
ceedings.44
From an institutional design perspective, important features of the
current claim construction scheme are:
1. Claim language is determined solely by judges, typically well in
advance of trial during what are (tellingly) known as Markman
hearings.45
2. A district court’s claim construction is reviewed de novo on
appeal to the Federal Circuit.  No formal deference is given to
the district court or, for that matter, the PTO.46  At this point,
41
No—at least not in U.S. Patent No. 5,202,835 (issued Apr. 13, 1993), entitled
“Trolling Motor With Heading Lock.”  See  Johnson Worldwide Assocs. v. Zebco Corp.,
175 F.3d 985, 992 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that the meaning of the term “‘cou-
pled’ . . . is not limited to a mechanical or physical coupling”).
42
Not a twelve-degree rise in U.S. Patent No. 5,456,202 (issued Oct. 10, 1995), en-
titled “Planing Boat Hull.”  See  Schoell v. Regal Marine Indus., 247 F.3d 1202, 1208-09
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[A] twelve degree V-shape [keel] cannot be both V-shaped and gen-
erally flat.”).
43
The standard used by the PTO is the “broadest reasonable interpretation,”
which is not a standard present in the non-PTO context.  In re Graves, 69 F.3d 1147,
1152 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (quoting DeGeorge v. Bernier, 768 F.2d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1985));
see also U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE § 2111 (2003) (“During patent examination, the pending claims must be
‘given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification.’”
(quoting In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000))); infra note 142 (describing
in further detail the PTO’s use of  the “broadest reasonable interpretation” standard).
44
Some commentators, notably Professor Duffy, suggest that the PTO’s construc-
tions should be given increased deference, due to its technical competence and lower
operating cost.  Duffy, supra note 10, at 126-35.
45
See, e.g., William F. Lee & Anita K. Krug, Still Adjusting to Markman:  A Prescrip-
tion for the Timing of Claim Construction Hearings, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 55, 59 (1999).
46
See Duffy, supra note 10, at 118 (explaining that the Federal Circuit has treated
claim construction “as a purely legal question”).
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the Federal Circuit has never accepted any interlocutory ap-
peals on issues of claim construction.47
From an operational perspective, the patent law contains a wide
variety of “canons of construction” that purport to guide the analysis.48
As has been noted by the court itself, however, many, if not all, of
these canons are contradictory and not especially useful.49  Indeed, it
is the efforts to resolve the tension between a pair of these canons—
(a) that claims are to be interpreted in light of the specification and
prosecution history and (b) that claims may not be modified beyond
their actual language by reference to the specification or prosecution
history—that creates the split in authority that forms the basis of this
study.
Though the precise magnitude of its role is a matter of consider-
able debate,50 it is clear that claim construction plays a major—and
perhaps the major—role in patent infringement litigation.  And with
the gradual decline in favor of the doctrine of equivalents—a judicial
doctrine allowing patentees to exclude others from making, using,
and selling subject matter beyond the scope of, but “equivalent” to,
their claims51—there is reason to expect that the importance of claim
interpretation will only increase.
47
See, e.g., Nard, Process Considerations, supra note 10, at 372-74 (decrying the denial
of interlocutory appeals).  Many district court judges, however, simply enter summary
judgment for one of the parties after construing the claims, creating a de facto inter-
locutory appeal.  See  John R. Lane & Christine A. Pepe, Living Before, Through, and With
Markman:  Claim Construction as a Matter of Law, 1 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 59, 64
(2001) (“[L]itigants have developed the practice of using preliminary injunctions and
summary judgment motions to obtain early claim construction rules and possible pre-
trial Federal Circuit review of the district court’s claim construction.”).
48
See, e.g., Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp., 274 F.3d 1336, 1341-48 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (describing the canons of construction the Federal Circuit employs in claim
construction analysis).
49
Indeed, the patent law features canons to avoid the use of canons.  See, e.g.,
Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (“In utilizing all
the patent documents, one should not sacrifice the value of these references by the
‘unimaginative adherence to well-worn professional phrases.’” (quoting Felix Frank-
furter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 529 (1947)));
see also Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248 n.2 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (citing Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the
Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06
(1950) (illustrating the tractability of canons of construction)).
50
See, e.g., Markman I, 52 F.3d at 993 (Mayer, J., concurring) (asserting that claim
construction often determines the outcome of patent cases).
51
See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21
(1997) (addressing the claim scope available under the doctrine of equivalents).
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Thus armed with some general background information about
patent claim construction, we can turn now to the details of the insti-
tutional arrangements and their implications.
2.  Markman  and the Express Mandate
It has been almost seven years since the Supreme Court’s decision
in Markman II set into place the basic structural design of the claim
construction process.  Holding that the Seventh Amendment’s guar-
antee of a jury trial did not apply to the interpretation of the patent
document, the Court made quite clear that the question was “exclu-
sively within the province of the court.”52  More important than the
holding, however, was the reasoning.  Justice Souter, writing for a
unanimous Court, framed the issue in traditional (and traditionally
narrow) Seventh Amendment terms:  whether the right to a trial by
jury existed under the English common law in the late eighteenth
century.53  The Court noted that while patent infringement actions
were unquestionably tried to juries during the relevant time period,
the historical record was far less clear regarding the locus of decision-
making on interpretation.  The Court’s historical analysis was—as one
might imagine—substantially complicated on this point because pat-
ent claims (at least as we understand them now) did not exist until the
early 1800s,54 did not receive formal legal recognition until 1836,55 and
were not required of all patentees until 1870.56  Thus, the court turned
to the body of the patent document itself—the specification57—as a
contemporaneous analogue.  Surveying what it described as the “mere
smattering” of relevant cases,58 the Court concluded that there was no
evidence that eighteenth-century juries had interpreted patent docu-
ments and found it telling that “as soon as the English [courts] did
begin to describe the construction of patent documents” in the early
1800s, they indicated that the judge was the interpreter, not the jury.59
52
Markman II, 517 U.S. at 372.
53
Id. at 376.
54
See William Redin Woodward, Definiteness and Particularity in Patent Claims, 46
MICH. L. REV. 755, 758 (1948) (“Probably the first examples of real patent claims in
the modern sense were contained in the patent granted to Robert Fulton on February
9, 1811, which included several separate statements in the form of claims.”).
55
Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119.
56
Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198, 201.
57
In patent parlance, the “specification” is the document itself, which includes a
written description, the claims, and often, drawings or diagrams.
58
Markman II, 517 U.S. at 379-81.
59
Id. at 382.
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Thus, the Court rejected the argument that the Seventh Amendment
guaranteed the role of the jury in claim construction.60
Significantly, Markman II  here turns from description to prescrip-
tion.  That is, having found no constitutional reason to task the jury
with claim construction, the Court—after noting that longstanding
precedent (at least weakly and to some extent) supported an exclusive
judicial role61—ultimately rested its decision on purely “functional
considerations.”62  These factors took two forms.  The first was the
Court’s expectation that judges—by virtue of their special skills and
experience, as well as the “highly technical” nature of patent claim
construction and the “special doctrines” developed by the courts for
their interpretation63—were simply more likely to be better at the task
than “jurors unburdened by training in exegesis.”64  Second, the allo-
cation of interpretive authority to judges was, the Court suggested,
likely to promote the goals of intrajurisdictional certainty and uni-
formity.65  Whether the Court got it “right” when it analyzed these fac-
tors is obviously a matter of some debate, which has been widely
60
Id. at 383-84.
61
See id. at 384 n.10 (“[W]e conclude that our precedent supports classifying the
question as one for the court . . . .”); see also id. at 387 (noting the “fine” line drawn be-
tween questions of interpretation and infringement, and the roles of the judge and
jury, in nineteenth-century Supreme Court patent cases); cf. id. at 388 (suggesting such
precedent provided “no clear answers”).
62
Id. at 388.
63
Id. at 389 (quoting Woodward, supra note 54, at 765).  The Court downplayed
the influence of credibility determinations, which it described as “the jury’s forte,” in
claim construction analyses, reasoning that credibility determinations would rarely be a
deciding factor and that, to the extent they existed, they would be “subsumed within
the necessarily sophisticated analysis of the whole document.”  Id.
64
Id. at 388.
65
The Court’s discussion noted that it was especially concerned with uniformity of
treatment concerning a particular patent—one that presumably might be litigated
nearly contemporaneously in multiple jurisdictions.  See id. at 390 (“[W]e see the im-
portance of uniformity in the treatment of a given patent as an independent reason to
allocate all issues of construction to the court.”).  By designating the interpretive issue
as a matter of law, Markman II  suggested that principles of stare decisis might serve to
maintain intrajurisdictional uniformity prior to appellate review.  See id. at 391 (noting
that issue preclusion would be unavailable against new and independent infringement
defendants).  On this ground, however, the Court’s concerns seem overstated; the dis-
trict courts have used their discretionary case management tools to largely avoid any
potential intrajurisdictional conflicts concerning the same patent.  See, e.g., Genfoot,
Inc. v. Payless ShoeSource, Inc., No. 03-398-SLR, 2003 WL 22953183, at *2 (D. Del.
Dec. 3, 2003) (stating that transfer of venue to consolidate cases involving the same
patents and parties is the “norm” because it “promote[s] judicial administration and
consistency of results”).
1122 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 152: 1105
discussed and debated in the literature.66  However, from the perspec-
tive of institutional design, the importance of the Court’s discussion is
not the detailed analysis as much as the underlying assumptions (and,
indeed, requirements) concerning the framework of the claim con-
struction process.  As an initial point, the Court was fairly explicit
about its criteria for measuring the goodness of competing systems:
correctness,67 uniformity,68 and certainty.69  Second, and perhaps more
significantly, both functional factors identified by the Court share a
unifying underlying principle:  the existence of specific legal rules
guiding the interpretation of patent claims.  For example, in suggest-
ing that judges were likely to be better at construing claims, the Court
cited “special doctrines” relating to construction embedded in the
law.70  Further, stare decisis—the strong judicial convention of adher-
ence to existing judicial precedent—anchored the Court’s argument
that judicial decision making in this context would enhance uniform-
ity and certainty.71  Thus, in both cases, Markman II ’s functionalist ap-
proach was largely based on the theory that allocating the interpretive
task to judges would extend and enhance the development of legal
rules guiding the construction of patent claims.
And yet the logic of Markman II clearly encompasses a prescriptive
aspect as well.  If the Court assigned claim construction to judges on
the theory that doing so would result in the continued use and devel-
opment of legal rules, then it follows that such legal rules (and their
development) are not simply hortatory, but are instead a mandatory
aspect of the institutional arrangements surrounding claim construc-
tion.  In essence, the Markman II decision granted the judges the
66
For example, the Court made an explicitly empirical assumption about the
prevalence of conflicting expert testimony on claim construction.  See Markman II, 517
U.S.  at 389 (“[I]n theory there could be a case in which a simple credibility judgment
would suffice to choose between experts . . . [b]ut our own experience with document
construction leaves us doubtful that trial courts will run into many cases like that.”).
67
See id. at 388 (noting that “judges often do [interpret] and are likely to do better
[at interpreting]” written instruments).
68
See id. at 390-91 (discussing the benefits of uniform treatment of patents and
citing the creation of the Federal Circuit as an example of the push for such uniform-
ity).
69
See id. (discussing intrajurisdictional certainty).
70
Id. at 389 (quoting Woodward, supra note 54, at 765).  This reasoning, of
course, has the flavor of circularity about it:  citing the existence and strength of judi-
cially-created doctrine as a reason to allocate interpretive authority to judges.  The
Court here clearly assumed a stronger baseline in favor of judicial interpretation than
it seemed to have acknowledged earlier in the opinion.  See supra note 61 (citing the
Court’s acknowledgment that precedent provided “no clear answers”).
71
Markman II, 517 U.S. at 391.
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power to construe patent claims, but this grant was clearly condi-
tioned on the use and development of legal-doctrinal “rules and tools”
to provide clarity and uniformity in the treatment of interpretive is-
sues.72  Absent a uniform legal framework, the basic premise of the
Court’s functionalist analysis is absent.
Significantly, the Federal Circuit has, to no small extent, amplified
the effect of the Supreme Court’s prescription in Markman II.  In Cybor
Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc.,73 an en banc court responded to the
challenge.  While the Cybor majority opinion, joined by nine judges,
has been described as “unfortunate”74 and involving “strained reason-
ing” in the “manufacture [of] legal fictions,”75 relatively few commen-
tators have fully considered the logical framework underlying Cybor.
This is understandable in part because the majority opinion focused
almost entirely upon the question of whether claim construction is an
inquiry of “fact” or “law” and, more particularly, upon whether Mark-
man II stated a view on the matter.76  It is easy to criticize this form of
analysis; even the Supreme Court in Markman II noted that divining
the fact/law distinction is considerably less satisfactory than an analy-
sis grounded in historical analogues and functional considerations.77
By declaring the interpretation of patent claims as “purely legal,” the
Cybor majority reasoned that no deference was due a district court’s
claim construction and that appellate review was to be conducted de
novo.78  Unfortunately, the Cybor majority did not base its argument
on institutional design considerations, the instrumentally appropriate
72
Id. at 390-91.
73
138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
74
Duffy, supra note 10, at 119.
75
Nard, Claim Interpretation, supra note 10, at 35.
76
See Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1455-56.
77
See Markman II, 517 U.S. at 378 (“[T]he sounder practice, when available, is
to classify a mongrel practice [like claim construction] by using the historical
method . . . .”); see also id. at 384 (noting the difficulty of drawing the fact/law distinc-
tion in claim construction); Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 401 (1990)
(observing the difficulty in distinguishing between factual and legal issues); United
States v. McKinney, 919 F.2d 405, 419 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring) (deter-
mining the standard of review on the basis of facts versus law would be “absurd”);
Duffy, supra note 10, at 122-23 & nn.51-53 (suggesting that Cybor’s choice between
standards of review “cannot be made on the basis of metaphysical distinctions between
fact and law”); Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 863 (1992) (de-
scribing the historical convention of the fact/law distinction).
78
Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1456 (“[W]e therefore reaffirm that, as a purely legal ques-
tion, we review claim construction de novo on appeal . . . .”).
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location of this decision-making authority.79  Rather, as Professor
Duffy has aptly noted, the opinion can really only be viewed as implic-
itly reinforcing the Federal Circuit as the superlative administrative
player in the claim construction process.80  Thus, the Federal Circuit
has not merely embraced the special mandate underlying the Mark-
man II decision—it has reinforced it.
C.  A Look Inside:  Claim Construction and the Federal Circuit
The preceding Sections have demonstrated that the Federal Cir-
cuit, by conscious institutional design, has been placed at the center
of the patent law, and that claim construction, in particular, repre-
sents a doctrinal area of special significance for implementation of the
court’s mandate.  Indeed, it would be difficult to understate this is-
sue’s centrality to the court.  The premise of the institutional design
scheme established by Congress, amplified by the Supreme Court in
Markman II, and executed by the Federal Circuit is that the court
should utilize its dominant role in claim construction to build the
rules and tools so that district courts, patentees, and interested mem-
bers of the public can confidently analyze claim construction issues.
79
   See id. at 1477 (Rader, J., dissenting) (arguing that “the trial judge enjoys a po-
tentially superior position to engage in claim interpretation” over the Federal Circuit).
80
Duffy, supra note 10, at 123 (“The majority’s holding in favor of de novo review
must be viewed as an implicit determination [regarding institutional design].”).  Duffy
(and others) have argued that the choice of de novo review in Cybor undermined the
goal of uniformity, perhaps in an effort to increase procedural efficiency.  See id. at 124
(“Both deferential and de novo standards trade one set of costs for another.”); see also
Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1476 (Mayer, C.J., concurring) (explaining that, as a matter of law,
claim interpretation is subject to a 50% reversal rate on appellate review, which creates
uncertainty and weakens the benefits of Markman I).  Yet, it is not necessarily the case
that a de novo standard of review will either undermine certainty or reduce the effi-
ciency of the system.  De novo review need not be viewed as an invasive mechanism by
which the appellate court can put its stamp of approval on every decision.  Instead, it
can be viewed as a means to an end:  a tool with which to develop and enforce rules
governing claim construction.  That is, if the de novo review process allows the Federal
Circuit to establish clear guidelines for the interpretation of patent claims, certainty
and efficiency would be enhanced, not diminished.  Clear rules would allow district
court judges to implement claim constructions with greater confidence, allow the par-
ties to better evaluate their chances of success (both post-judgment and pre-litigation),
and perhaps most significantly, result in patentees drafting clearer claims prior to a
patent’s issue.  This general point—that patent rules are often best considered as ex
ante incentive-based mechanisms—is one that one of us has made elsewhere.  See R.
Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel:  Patent Administration and the Failure of Festo, 151 U.
PA. L. REV. 159, 243 (2002) (“In the patent context, featuring significant informational
challenges and costly ex post determinations of liability, a focus on the ex ante effects
of any particular legal rule seems especially appropriate.”).
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In addition, as noted above, particular features of claim construc-
tion make the doctrine especially relevant to considerations of institu-
tional design, such as:
1. It is an excellent test of how the Federal Circuit uses its
authority.  Because of the issue’s status as a question of law
and the lack of any statutory or Supreme Court guidelines
(other than Markman II ’s express mandate to develop guide-
lines), the court is uniquely in control of the establishment
and implementation of claim construction procedures.
2. Claim construction is perhaps the central issue in any analysis
of a patent—whether conducted privately, in connection with
an application to the PTO, or during litigation.  Because claim
construction is often (if not always) dispositive, it is almost al-
ways argued, litigated, and disputed.
3. Largely because of the previous two factors, the Federal Cir-
cuit case law on claim construction is extensive, allowing for
the development of a large dataset.
Where, as here, the query of interest is whether (and how) the
Federal Circuit is adequately responding to its congressional mandate
(and, in particular, the special prescriptions related to claim construc-
tion), the best analytic strategy is to evaluate the relevant doctrine di-
rectly, seeking to measure the court’s progress towards the goals of
clarity, coherence, and predictability within the administration of the
patent law.  The court’s claim construction jurisprudence thus pro-
vides a rich resource by which to objectively describe the success, to
date, of the Federal Circuit.
II.  STUDY DESIGN
Having identified claim construction as perhaps the most relevant
doctrinal area for evaluating the Federal Circuit’s managerial role in
the U.S. patent system, this Part turns to the details of study design,
starting with the choice of judicial opinions as the source of data.
A.  Measuring Jurisprudence:  Court Opinions as Data
A key design choice faced at the outset concerned the identifica-
tion of a source of information that allowed the sort of systematic
analysis needed for this study.  There are several ways one might
gather data about the nature of the Federal Circuit’s claim
construction jurisprudence.  One option would be to conduct a survey
of the judges, with questions relating to the sorts of reasoning or
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methodologies they use in conducting claim construction.  Alterna-
tively, one might survey patent practitioners and scholars, requesting
information concerning the typicality of certain types of observed
methodological approaches.  Each of these options might provide in-
formation about the variable in question, but each also suffers from a
number of validity problems, including the possibility of systematic
bias, the difficulties in developing reliable survey instruments, and
(for judicial surveys) the general unreliability of responses received
from those persons under study.81  To avoid such pitfalls, this study
evaluates the Federal Circuit’s methodological approach to claim con-
struction by measuring—that is, categorizing according to standard-
ized criteria—the court’s expressions of its methodology in the
opinions accompanying judicial decisions.  In other words, for the
purposes of this study, written judicial opinions were treated as data
sources.82  Of course, mining a large number of judicial opinions to
81
See Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy DeCamp Wilson, Telling More Than We Can
Know:  Verbal Reports on Mental Processes, 84 PSYCHOL. REV. 231, 233 (1977) (noting that
subjective reports about one’s own experience and thinking are highly inaccurate);
Wendy M. Rahn et al., Rationalization and Derivation Processes in Survey Studies of Political
Candidate Evaluation, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 582, 595-96 (1994) (finding that self-reporting
voters rationalize their preferences rather than describe the actual reasoning for their
preferences).
82
There are several other studies (albeit not in the patent area) that use similar
techniques.  See Gerard Anderson et al., When Courts Review Medical Appropriateness, 36
MED. CARE 1295, 1296-97 (1998) (coding and statistically analyzing judicial opinions in
state and federal insurance coverage cases); Mark A. Hall et al., Judicial Protection of
Managed Care Consumers:  An Empirical Study of Insurance Coverage Disputes, 26 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1055, 1056-59 (1996) (coding state and federal judicial opinions about
health insurance disputes involving issues of medical appropriateness); Peter J. Ham-
mer & William M. Sage, Antitrust, Health Care Quality, and the Courts, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 545, 553-59 (2002) (coding health care-related antitrust opinions for reasoning
according to aspects of quality and nonprice competition); James A. Henderson, Jr.,
Judicial Reliance on Public Policy:  An Empirical Analysis of Products Liability Decisions, 59
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1570, 1586-89 (1991) (coding 2517 judicial opinions in products
liability cases and analyzing the type and frequency of different forms of judicial rea-
soning); Peter D. Jacobson et al., The Role of the Courts in Shaping Health Policy:  An Em-
pirical Analysis, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 278, 280-86 (2001) (coding judicial opinions and
assessing the relationship between types of judicial reasoning and case outcomes); Ann
Juliano & Stewart J. Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases, 86 CORNELL L. REV.
548, 549-50, 555-60 (2001) (conducting a statistical analysis of 650 judicial opinions in
federal sexual harassment cases between 1986 and 1996); Andrew P. Morriss, Developing
a Framework for Empirical Research on the Common Law:  General Principles and Case Studies
of the Decline of Employment-at-Will, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 999, 1059-92 (1995) (study-
ing the content of judicial opinions in the context of evolution of common law doc-
trine); Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender, Work, and Choice:  An Empirical
Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging Job Segregation, 59 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1073, 1089-95 (1992) (conducting a statistical analysis of federal judicial opin-
ions between 1965 and 1989 in Title VII cases); Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the
2004] IS THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT SUCCEEDING? 1127
collect relevant information is not so different from what lawyers do
every day.  The difference here is that the data was collected more sys-
tematically and measured by more rigid criteria.
Note also that the overall goal of the project—providing direct in-
sight into the contemporary questions of institutional design of the
patent system—effectively precludes using case outcomes (i.e., affir-
mance or reversal rates) as the basis of measurement.83  To be sure,
reversal rates between 30% and 50%, as found recently in separate
studies by Christian Chu and Kimberly Moore, might suggest prob-
lems in the jurisprudence of claim construction (or application
thereof).84  Yet because the reversal rate describes the district courts’
performance (albeit as measured by the Federal Circuit), it explains
little about the Federal Circuit itself.  For example, a high reversal rate
could indicate that nonspecialized district courts are simply unsuited
to the often complex technological task of claim construction.85  Or,
the rates could reflect that the doctrinal rules are still in a “shaking
out” period in the district courts and will decrease with increasing fa-
miliarity among trial judges.86  Or, perhaps, the high reversal rates
could represent a widespread disconnect between the Federal Circuit
and the district courts, resulting in the underuse or misuse of the
relevant doctrine.  Therefore, result-oriented statistical studies, while
Influence on the Judicial Mind:  An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1377, 1383 (1998) (coding judicial opinions according to constitutional reasoning).
83
But cf.  Chu, supra note 10, at 1096-1106 (using the reversal rate to analyze
trends in the Federal Circuit’s claim construction jurisprudence); Moore, supra note
14, at 2-4, 11-17 (using the Federal Circuit’s reversal rate to question the district court’s
ability to analyze claim construction).  See also  John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, How
Federal Circuit Judges Vote in Patent Validity Cases, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 745, 746-49
(2000) (analyzing results of decisions on validity); Donald R. Dunner et al., A Statistical
Look at the Federal Circuit’s Patent Decisions:  1982–1994, 5 FED. CIR. B.J. 151, 153-56
(1995) (analyzing the proportion of certain results—invalidity, infringement, etc.—in
Federal Circuit precedent); Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Em-
pirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 369-74 (2000) (analyzing results of
jury trials in patent cases).
84
See  Chu, supra note 10, at 1097-1100 (positing that a reversal rate of 50% means
the losing party is unlikely to settle without appeal); Moore, supra note 14, at 38 (“The
33% reversal rate of district court claim constructions suggests that judges are not, at
present, capable of resolving these issues with sufficient accuracy.”).
85
For a similar conclusion, see Chu, supra note 10, at 1106; see also Moore, supra
note 14, at 3.
86
Chu dismisses this as “unlikely” given the role of patent-specific practitioners in
informing judges.  Chu, supra note 10, at 1106.  But the point here is not that the trial
courts literally do not know the appropriate rules, but that their unfamiliarity and in-
experience in using them (which would be reflected among all parties) could increase
the variability of the decisions.
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obviously valuable for evaluating the performance of the district
courts, should not be taken as establishing a causal link to Federal
Circuit doctrine or methodology.87
This study thus utilizes the court’s jurisprudence itself as the rele-
vant data source, measuring aspects of the Federal Circuit’s decision
making as expressed in written judicial decisions.  Given the object of
the study—to analyze whether the court is effectively meeting its man-
date for developing and managing a clear, coherent, and predictable
jurisprudence—measuring the jurisprudence is most likely to provide
the insights we seek.
Of course, choosing to use judicial opinions as data sources to
measure judicial reasoning or methodology has a number of implica-
tions.  Consider the following oft-cited concerns and limitations about
using judicial opinions for systematic study:
• Unobserved Reasoning.  Analyzing the content of judicial opin-
ions assumes that the expression in a given opinion accurately
reflects the actual process by which the result was reached.
There is clearly at least some reason to question this assump-
tion,88 if for no other reason than, as noted by Edward Rubin,
the author of the opinion is primarily concerned with “jus-
tify[ing] her conclusion by showing that it proceeds from ac-
cepted sources by legitimate, properly argued steps.”89
• Selection Bias.  Judicial opinions, and in particular appellate
court opinions, clearly do not represent the universe of dis-
putes; it is therefore possible that the cases which generate a
judicial opinion contain some systematic bias.  For example, it
is possible that claim constructions conducted by the Federal
Circuit concern particularly complex technology or are the re-
sult of especially poorly drafted claims.90  Further, even though
87
For example, Chu notes that his study of the results of claim construction re-
views provides little help in evaluating the reasons that reversal rates are at any particu-
lar level.  Id. at 1106-07.
88
See, e.g., William M. Sage, Judicial Opinions Involving Health Insurance Coverage:
Trompe L’Oeil or Window on the World?, 31 IND. L. REV. 49, 61-68 (1998) (identifying
small sample size, long time lags, selection bias, publication bias, and unstated ration-
ales as the limitations of a judicial dataset).
89
Edward L. Rubin, The Concept of Law and the New Public Law Scholarship, 89 MICH.
L. REV. 792, 801 (1991).
90
The authors do not believe this to be the case here.  The population of opinions
cover a huge variety of technologies, and while the quality of a patent claim is difficult
to discern—especially when it is the subject of major litigation—neither coder ob-
served systemic problems with claim quality.
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the dataset contained all written opinions—even those desig-
nated as “unpublished” or “non-precedential” by the court—it
could not contain those decisions by the Federal Circuit that
did not result in an opinion.91
• Strategic Behavior.  In analyzing the output of judicial opinions,
this study did not seek to account for various inputs that might
have affected the outcome or reasoning, such as the quality of
arguments, strategic choices by parties, or even strategic be-
havior by judges.92  A particular concern relevant to this study
is the possibility that the judicial reasoning expressed in an
opinion may be substantially affected by the arguments and
methodologies employed by the litigants.  For example, both
litigants may, for strategic reasons, advocate similar methodo-
logical approaches (although seeking different results), mak-
ing it more likely that the court would adopt such an
approach.  For this reason, it is perhaps unrealistic to view
such opinions as truly independent expressions of methodol-
ogy or reasoning.
While the concerns described above are at least potential limita-
tions on the utility of this study, given the general hypothesis being
tested, there are reasons to expect that these problems are less signifi-
cant than might otherwise be the case.  Recall that this study seeks to
determine whether the Federal Circuit has developed a workable set
of claim construction guidelines—the “rules and tools” mandated by
the Supreme Court in Markman II and acknowledged in Markman I
and Cybor.93  In particular, note that the object of the study is not the
underlying methodological view of the Federal Circuit judges but the
content of the relevant jurisprudence.  In this respect, then, this study
differs from many similar studies which seek to extract information
(for example, the role that background factors may play in influenc-
ing judicial reasoning94 or the general use of health-care quality and
other non-price factors in market-based analyses95) distinct from the
expressed text of the opinions.  Thus, for example, concern about the
91
See FED. R. APP. P. 36 (permitting judgments to be rendered without an opin-
ion).
92
See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize?  (The Same Thing
Everyone Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 23-30 (1993) (describing how judges’ mo-
tivations can affect judicial decisions).
93
Supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text; see also supra text accompanying notes
72-80.
94
Sisk et al., supra note 82, at 1385-92, 1415-30, 1451-80.
95
Hammer & Sage, supra note 82, at 609-36.
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unobservability of the “true” reasoning of the judges is mitigated by
the understanding that these unobservable aspects are not, by design,
involved in evaluating the validity of the hypothesis.  Likewise, while
selection bias is undoubtedly a generalized problem with any sort of
case-based research, the population of cases of relevance here (those
which provide information to other institutional players) are precisely
those contained in the dataset.  There is perhaps somewhat more
cause for concern regarding the possibility of bias in the dataset due
to strategic factors—especially those that might impact the way that
the methodological decision making is described in the opinions.
However, even here a similar qualification holds true:  because the
goal is to systematically evaluate the content of the jurisprudence, fac-
tors that may have distorted the body of the law will be reflected in
both the study results and the actual guidance provided by the cases.96
Accordingly, while the possibility that these issues may affect our
study’s results cannot be eliminated, any major impact seems unlikely.
(There are, of course, significant limitations to this study due to other
factors, as noted in the following Sections.)
B.  Procedural Versus Holistic:  Selecting Measurement Criteria
Perhaps the most significant design choice in this study was the
determination of the criteria by which the object of measurement—
the methodology expressed in the relevant judicial opinions—was to
be described.  Given the complete absence of similar studies in the pat-
ent context, the development of measurement criteria required some
substantial innovation; as a result, attempts were made to ensure sub-
stantial conformance with appropriate scientific norms.97  The basic
question, of course, was how to categorize methodological approaches
to the claim construction problem.  In particular, given the object of
the study, the inquiry was whether there were possible methodological
characteristics, ascertained from a sampling of the cases, that were suf-
ficiently distinct as to allow for reliable categorization.98
96
Thus, to the extent that systemic bias in expressions of methodology may exist
due to the parties’ arguments and approaches, perhaps one implication of the study is
that judges should seek to avoid simply responding to parties’ arguments and instead
should view each opinion as a contribution to the wider jurisprudence.
97
See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 80-97
(2002) (describing the importance and evaluation of measurement criteria).
98
See id. at 83-87 (discussing reliability).
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1.  A Review of the Literature
An initial source for developing possible criteria was the relatively
large post-Markman II scholarly literature on claim construction, un-
der the theory that perhaps academic consensus and prior research
could inform our inquiry.  A review of that work revealed relatively few
serious efforts to broadly describe features of the Federal Circuit’s
claim construction methodologies, at least in a manner relevant to the
tasks here.  One proposal was the distinction between what Professor
Craig Allen Nard described as “pragmatic textualism” and “hypertex-
tualism.”99  As set forth by Nard, the distinction between these meth-
odologies is primarily on the basis of “view[s] of judicial power” and is
reflected in differing approaches to the standard of review and the
treatment of extrinsic evidence.100  In Nard’s view, “pragmatic textual-
ists” freely consider information concerning the accepted meanings of
particular terms in the relevant fields while “embracing the impor-
tance of textual fidelity and internal coherence,” whereas “hypertex-
tualists” eschew any contextual basis for determining the meaning of
claim terms.101  Thus, it appears that the distinction Nard would draw
involves two dimensions:  the first is between a methodology that ad-
mits at least some forms of extrinsic evidence for context (pragmatic
textualism) and one that does not (hypertextualism), and the second
is between a methodology that offers at least some measure of defer-
ence to district court interpretations (pragmatic textualism) and one
that sticks to de novo review (hypertextualism).  This categorization
approach was considered against a sample of the judicial opinion da-
taset, but ultimately was rejected.  First, intuition and experience with
the relevant jurisprudence suggested that the pragmatic/hypertextual-
ist differences would likely be difficult to discern across the number of
opinions evaluated in this study.  Both of Nard’s distinctions—the use
of contextual extrinsic evidence and the standard of review—appear
to be matters of settled law and thus show remarkable uniformity.102
99
Nard, Claim Interpretation, supra note 10, at 4-6.
100
Id. at 5-6.
101
Id.
102
As should be evident from the discussion in Part I of this Article, the standard
of review question has been entirely settled since Cybor  in 1998 and virtually settled
since Markman I  in 1995.  In fact, the en banc court in Cybor noted only four cases that
it considered even arguably inconsistent with the de novo standard of review estab-
lished by Markman I.  Cybor, 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998).  Thus, reliably ob-
serving distinctions between opinions on the basis of the standard of review would
appear to be extraordinarily difficult.  See, e.g., Nard, Claim Interpretation, supra note 10,
at 28 (noting that Cybor resolved this issue).
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Accordingly, it was extremely difficult to discern the proposed meth-
odologies from the written opinions, even some of those discussed ex-
tensively in the text.103
We note that another academic effort, while not seeking to draw
broad conclusions regarding claim construction jurisprudence, dove-
tailed far better with our initial review of the opinion dataset.  In Pat-
ent Claim Interpretation After Markman:  How the Federal Circuit Interprets
Claims,104 John Romary and Arie Michelsohn sought to present a posi-
tive account of the court’s claim construction jurisprudence.105  In do-
ing so, they noted tensions in the case law concerning the emphasis
given to the “ordinary meaning” of the claims,106 and the utilization of
A potentially more fruitful line of difference concerns the use of contextual (in
patent parlance, “extrinsic”) evidence to inform the meaning of the claim language.
But again this distinction seems quite difficult to discern in the case law.  To the extent
that there was doctrinal rigidity in the jurisprudence, see Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic,
Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996), it is unclear whether it actually prevented the con-
sideration of important contextual evidence; and this rigidity appears not to exist in
more current case law, which is replete with references to dictionaries, technical and
otherwise, as well as the increasing use of experts, see Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-
Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 1999).  To be sure, there is a clear distinction
concerning the hierarchical status of this type of information, and that distinction in-
forms this study’s measurement criteria.  But there does not seem to be a reliable cate-
gorization according to the consideration of this information.
We should be clear that this discussion is not meant as a critique of Nard’s discus-
sion of competing interpretive theories (though we suspect we disagree on many
points).  To a large degree, Nard’s project is more normative than descriptive, which,
while not detracting from the scholarship, nonetheless makes his categories less useful
for systematic evaluation purposes.
103
For example, Nard cites K-2 Corp. v. Salomon S.A., 191 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir.
1999), as a clear example of the pragmatic/hypertextualist distinction.  Nard, Claim
Interpretation, supra note 10, at 61.  In a passage quoted by Nard, Judge Rader in dissent
suggested that the majority failed to ascertain the correct meaning of the phrase “per-
manently affixed” because it declined to return the case to the district court for fact-
finding on the meaning of “permanently” within the in-line skate art.  K-2 Corp., 191
F.3d at 1370 (Rader, J., dissenting).  Yet the majority opinion also engaged in what
Nard describes as “pragmatic” reasoning:  (1) neither party suggested at any time that
the word “permanently” had a special meaning in this technological context (and,
thus, the word was presumed to be given its common definition); and (2) in the con-
text of the current dispute (the accused device had a removable screw where the pat-
ent claim called for a “permanent” affixation), the accused device clearly fell outside
any reasonable contextual interpretation of “permanently.”  Id. at 1356.  Thus, it seems
difficult to discern the line Nard seeks to draw, except to the extent that the distinction
is one simply of the degree of “pragmatism” involved (though one is left wondering
what is “pragmatic” about requiring extensive expert testimony and evidentiary inquir-
ies into the meaning of a commonly understood, nontechnical word).
104
Romary & Michelsohn, supra note 15, at 1887.
105
Id. at 1892.
106
Id. at 1897-1917.
2004] IS THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT SUCCEEDING? 1133
the specification to inform claim terms107—both of which are clearly
described by the methodological dichotomy we develop below.
2.  “Bottom Up” Measurement Design
Ultimately, the opinions themselves inspired the design of this
study’s measurement criteria.  A reading of a broad sample of the
relevant dataset revealed a distinction between claim construction
methodologies on the basis of the hierarchical status given to the
sources of meaning of claim terms.  Throughout the relevant time pe-
riod, the Federal Circuit observably struggled with the tension inher-
ent in two generally accepted (and conventionally cited) “canons” of
claim construction:  (1) that claim language is read in light of the
specification of which it is a part; and (2) that the meaning of claim
language may not be altered by importing or reading-in changes from
outside the claims.  Taken together, these canons recognize that the
claim construction exercise is necessarily a contextual one, and they
also attempt to preserve the function of the claim as the ultimate
statement of patent scope.  And yet the canons’ inherent tension can-
not be easily set aside:  at what point does an appropriately contextual
analysis spill over into impermissible importation of meaning into the
claims?  It is the resolution of this tension—which fundamentally ex-
ists in all disputes about the meaning of claim language108—that pro-
vides the measurement criteria by which the Federal Circuit’s
methodological approach may be evaluated.
Two distinct approaches to resolving this tension were identified
and defined.  One line of reasoning, designated procedural, reveals a
fairly formal process for analyzing the meaning of disputed claim
terms, one that principally traverses according to a hierarchy of status
among the various sources of meaning.  The procedural approach
starts with a general presumption in favor of the ordinarily under-
stood meaning of claim language, typically drawn from a relevant
—often technical—dictionary, reference works, or common usage.  It
then follows a predetermined path of analysis, wherein any suggested
alteration from the ordinary meaning must be accompanied by
107
Id. at 1917-26.
108
In any dispute over claim language, one party or the other will almost invaria-
bly be arguing for more weight to be added to the “contextual” information, or at least
will present competing information that necessarily requires the court to determine
the weight it should be given.
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significant proof that such an alteration is required under the circum-
stances.
The alternative methodology, designated holistic, adopts a dis-
tinctly more free-form approach, seeking the correct meaning accord-
ing to the particular circumstances presented, rather than following
the formal steps and hierarchy of information sources seen in the
procedural method.  The holistic approach is significantly more re-
laxed than the procedural method in moving away from the ab-
stracted “ordinary meaning” of a term in favor of a more localized
understanding.109
An example of the court’s expression of the procedural approach
is Johnson Worldwide Associates v. Zebco Corp.:110
We begin, as with all claim interpretation analyses, with the language
of the claims.  The general rule is, of course, that terms in the claim are
to be given their ordinary and accustomed meaning.  General descrip-
tive terms will ordinarily be given their full meaning; modifiers will not
109
In order to avoid potential confusion (or perhaps ideological baggage), these
labels intentionally do not directly correspond with the well-known formalist (or “tex-
tualist”) and pragmatist schools of interpretive method, though the methodological
distinction drawn here obviously invokes at least aspects of that debate.  See Daniel A.
Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason:  Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45
VAND. L. REV. 533, 548-49 (1992) (arguing that the real competing “issue” between
formalists’ and pragmatics’ interpretive schemes is “the utility of a strong literalism
presumption”); see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRE-
TATION 50-57 (1994) (discussing the pragmatist approach); RICHARD A. POSNER,
OVERCOMING LAW 4-21 (1995) (same); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent
in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 59-66 (1988) (discussing the
textualist/formalist approach); John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine,
97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 674-75 (1997) (same); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a
Civil-Law System:  The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and
Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:  FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 23-29 (Amy
Gutmann ed., 1997) (same).  To be sure, both claim construction methodologies de-
scribed here acknowledge and consult essentially the same sources of meaning, includ-
ing what pragmatists call “contextual” information.  See, e.g., Nard, Claim Interpretation,
supra note 10, at 43-52 (discussing pragmatic approaches to claim interpretation); see
also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 296 (1990) (noting the
necessity of contextual information in discerning meaning); Stanley Fish, Almost Prag-
matism:  Richard Posner’s Jurisprudence, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1447, 1456 (1990) (same).
The critical difference here is in the process (or absence thereof) by which such in-
formation is used, with the “procedural” methodology ascribing to a significantly more
rigid hierarchy in classifying the status of competing information.  This distinction,
which is based more on the structure and import of information than its considera-
tion, seems to comport with at least some views of the textualist interpretive approach.
See, e.g., Manning, supra, at 696 (“Not even the most committed textualist would claim
that . . . texts are inherently ‘plain on their face,’ or that all interpretation takes place
within the four corners of the Statutes at Large.”).
110
175 F.3d 985 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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be added to broad terms standing alone.  In short, a court must presume
that the terms in the claim mean what they say, and, unless otherwise
compelled, give full effect to the ordinary and accustomed meaning of
claim terms.
In order to overcome this heavy presumption in favor of the ordinary
meaning of claim language, . . . . there must be a textual reference in the
actual language of the claim with which to associate a proffered claim
construction.
Our case law demonstrates two situations where a sufficient reason
exists to require the entry of a definition of a claim term other than its
ordinary and accustomed meaning.  The first arises if the patentee has
chosen to be his or her own lexicographer by clearly setting forth an ex-
plicit definition for a claim term.  The second is where the term or terms
chosen by the patentee so deprive the claim of clarity that there is no
means by which the scope of the claim may be ascertained from the lan-
guage used.  In these two circumstances, a term or terms used in the
claim invites—or indeed, requires—reference to intrinsic, or in some
cases, extrinsic, evidence to determine the scope of the claim lan-
guage.
111
By contrast, consider the discussion of methodology in Wang Laborato-
ries, Inc. v. America Online, Inc.:112
The parties agreed before the district court that the term “frame” can
in general usage be applied to bit-mapped display systems as well as to
character-based systems; experts for both sides so testified.  The dis-
agreement was as to whether the term “frame” in the ’669 claims em-
braced this general usage, or whether the term would be understood by
persons of skill in this field as limited to the character-based systems de-
scribed in the ’669 patent. The district court started its analysis with the
specification.
111
Id. at 989-90 (citations omitted); see also Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per
Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[T]he resulting claim interpretation
must . . . accord with the words chosen by the patentee . . . .”); Comark Communica-
tions, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1187 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“In this case, the [dis-
puted term] has a clear and well-defined meaning.  This term is not so amorphous that
one of skill in the art can only reconcile the claim language with the inventor’s disclo-
sure by recourse to the specification.”); Va. Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d
860, 865-66 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (concluding that intrinsic evidence does not require
modification of the ordinary meaning of “reciprocating”); York Prods., Inc. v. Cent.
Tractor Farm & Family Ctr., 99 F.3d 1568, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“Without an express
intent to impart a novel meaning to claim terms, an inventor’s claim terms take on
their ordinary meaning.”); Bell Communications Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Communi-
cations Corp., 55 F.3d 615, 621-22 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (determining that the unmodified
term “associating” is not limited to explicit association); Specialty Composites v. Cabot
Corp., 845 F.2d 981, 987 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that the unmodified term “plasti-
cizer” is given the full range of ordinary and accustomed meaning).
112
197 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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. . . .
The only system that is described and enabled in the ’669 specifica-
tion and drawings uses a character-based protocol.  The specification
mentions non-character-based protocols, [but] . . . . [t]he district court
viewed the references to bit-mapped protocols as acknowledgments of
the state of the art, and not as an enlargement of the invention de-
scribed in the patent.  We agree, and conclude that the references to
other known protocols do not describe them as included in the appli-
cant’s invention, and that the specification would not be so understood
by a person skilled in the field of the invention.
. . . .
Wang states that the character-based protocol is simply a “preferred
embodiment,” and that the embodiment described in the specification
does not set the boundaries of the claims . . . . Although precedent offers
assorted quotations in support of differing conclusions concerning the
scope of the specification, these cases must be viewed in the factual con-
text in which they arose.  Whether an invention is fairly claimed more
broadly than the “preferred embodiment” in the specification is a ques-
tion specific to the content of the specification, the context in which the
embodiment is described, the prosecution history, and if appropriate the
prior art, for claims should be construed, when feasible, to sustain their
validity.  The usage “preferred” does not of itself broaden the claims be-
yond their support in the specification.  The only embodiment described
in the ’669 patent specification is the character-based protocol, and the
claims were correctly interpreted as limited thereto.
113
It is this contrast between the procedural and the holistic methodo-
logical approaches that forms the basis of our measurement criteria.
C.  Developing the Coding Instrument
Once the measurement criteria were identified, a detailed coding
instrument was developed.  Initial review of a sample of the opin-
ion set suggested that, while the basic methodological dichotomy was
virtually certain to be present in each relevant case, many examples
113
Id. at 1381-83 (citations omitted).  Note that, essentially by definition, the holis-
tic methodological approach is more difficult to clearly discern from the cases.  See also
Cultor Corp. v. A.E. Staley Mfg., 224 F.3d 1328, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Whether a
claim must, in any particular case, be limited to the specific embodiment presented in
the specification, depends in each case on the specificity of the description of the in-
vention . . . .”); Toro Co. v. White Consol. Indus., 199 F.3d 1295, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(“The specification does not describe an invention broader than [the] description of
the cover and the restriction ring ‘automatically’ inserted and removed together.”);
O.I. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., 115 F.3d 1576, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“All of the ‘passage’
structures contemplated by the written description are . . . either non-smooth or coni-
cal.”).
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(and, more to the point, expressions) of either approach would likely
be found along a spectrum extending between strictly procedural and
strictly holistic.  Accordingly, in order to capture as much information
as possible, the coding instrument allowed scoring of opinions in
three categories of each methodology, representing strong, interme-
diate, and weak forms of the analysis.  Thus, the coding scheme can
be depicted graphically as in Figure 1 below.
Figure 1:  A Taxonomy of Methodological Approach
Procedural Holistic
Strong
(Ps)
Intermediate
(Pi)
Weak
(Pw)
Weak
(Hw)
Intermediate
(Hi)
Strong
(Hs)
A textual description of the various subcategories is in Table 1:
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Table 1:  A Taxonomy of Methodological Approach
Binomial
Categories
Procedural Holistic
Detailed
Categories
Strong
(Ps)
Intermediate
(Pi)
Weak
(Pw)
Weak
(Hw)
Intermedi-
ate (Hi)
Strong
(Hs)
Textual
Description
&
Coding
Instrument
Expresses
rigid
process.
Ordinary
meaning
controls,
absent
express
definitions,
etc.
Framework of
formal process
established.
Departure
along some
dimension:
no talk of
presumption,
extensive
discussion of
specification.
Difficult to
discern the
form of
analysis.
Some
discussion/
hint of
process.
Difficult to
discern the
form of
analysis.
Little or no
discussion
of process
or ordinary
meaning.
Acknow-
ledgement of
process, but
not used.
Specification
and/or
prosecution
history is
clearly
dispositive.
No discussion
of process.
Immediate
use of
specification
or prosecu-
tion history.
Example
Cases
Johnson
Worldwide
Assocs. v.
Zebco
Corp., 175
F.3d 985
(Fed. Cir.
1999)
Neomagic
Corp. v.
Trident
Microsys.
Inc., 287
F.3d 1062
(Fed. Cir.
2002)
CCS Fitness,
Inc. v.
Brunswick
Corp., 288
F.3d 1359
(Fed. Cir.
2002)
Insituform
Techs. v. Cat
Contracting,
Inc., 99 F.3d
1098 (Fed.
Cir. 1996)
Micro Chem.,
Inc. v. Great
Plains Chem.
Co., 194 F.3d
1250 (Fed.
Cir. 1999)
3M v. Chem-
que,  Inc., 303
F.3d 1294
(Fed. Cir.
2002)
Ethicon
Endo-
Surgery v.
U.S. Surgical
Corp., 93
F.3d 1572
(Fed. Cir.
1996)
Key Pharms.
v. Hercon
Lab. Corp.,
161 F.3d
709 (Fed.
Cir. 1998)
Brassica
Prot. Prods.
LLC v.
Sunrise
Farms, 301
F.3d 1343
(Fed. Cir.
2002)
Litton Sys.
v. Honey-
well,  Inc.,
87 F.3d
1559 (Fed.
Cir. 1996)
DSC Com-
muns. Corp.
v. Pulse
Communs.,
Inc., 170
F.3d 1354
(Fed. Cir.
1999)
Viskase
Corp. v.
Am. Nat'l
Can Co.,
261 F.3d
1316 (Fed.
Cir. 2001)
Harris Corp.
v. IXYS Corp.,
114 F.3d 1149
(Fed. Cir.
1997)
Aqua-Aerobic
Sys. v. Aera-
tors Inc., 211
F.3d 1241
(Fed. Cir.
2000)
Smith &
Nephew, Inc.
v. Ethicon,
Inc., 276 F.3d
1304 (Fed.
Cir. 2001)
O.I. Corp. v.
Tekmar Co.,
115 F.3d
1576 (Fed.
Cir. 1997)
Wang Labs.,
Inc. v. Am.
Online,
Inc., 197
F.3d 1377
(Fed. Cir.
1999)
Cultor
Corp. v. A.E.
Staley Mfg.,
224 F.3d
1328 (Fed.
Cir. 2000)
The coding instrument contains detailed definitions of each cate-
gory.  These definitions were revised several times based on feed-
back from coders and data concerning intracoder differences.  After
revision, the previously coded decisions were reconsidered in light
of the altered instrument.  In general, the instrument became increas-
ingly detailed and precise upon each revision, thereby promoting the
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general objective of reducing, as much as possible, the subjectivity of
coding determinations.114
D.  Evaluating the Measurement—Criteria I:  Reliability
As Lee Epstein and Gary King explain, there are two important
measures of the quality of any selected measurement criteria:  reliabil-
ity and validity.115  Reliability refers to the property of the measure-
ments as replicable and consistent, while validity refers to the extent
to which the underlying concept is actually being captured by the
measurement criteria.  Here, given the direct correspondence be-
tween the objects of the study (quantification of methodological dis-
tinctions in Federal Circuit claim construction cases), validity is not
really in question.116  Thus, the important evaluation is reliability.
As previously noted, we took care in developing the coding in-
strument to reduce, as much as possible, the subjectivity of coding de-
cisions—that is, to try to avoid coding according to general “judgment
calls” or “impressions.”  This practice is, of course, not only likely to
increase the accuracy of the coding, but is calculated to make the
study replicable or extensible by other researchers.
That being said, it must be acknowledged that the business of cod-
ing according to an expressed methodological approach—no matter
the steps taken to wring as much subjectivity from the process as pos-
sible—is quite difficult.  Furthermore, the coders in this study117 were
both attorneys with technological backgrounds, admissions to the pat-
ent bar, and significant exposure to Federal Circuit doctrine.
Whether our measurements could be successfully replicated by coders
with different experiences is an open question.  It is quite possible
that, given the technologically complex and often intensely factual na-
ture of many Federal Circuit opinions, this sort of study may actually
require a skill set that precludes most law students (or even non-
patent lawyers) from being coders.  While this is clearly an undesir-
able feature of the study, it may simply be inherent in the nature of
the approach chosen.
In order to further evaluate and confirm the reliability of the
measurements collected, each case in the dataset was independently
coded by two coders.  Discrepancies in coding were tallied, and the
114
See infra Part II.D (describing the authors’ coding methodology and process).
115
Epstein & King, supra note 97, at 82.
116
See supra Part II.E (discussing the validity of the measurement criteria).
117
Both authors coded all the opinions.
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coding differences were resolved by additional review of the opin-
ions.  Initial intercoder agreement was 92% on the basis of binomial
categorizations (i.e., not considering the subcategories) and 72%
across all categories.118
There seems to be relatively little attention paid in the literature
to the “appropriate” level of intercoder agreement for studies of this
type;119 thus, confident conclusions are difficult to draw from this in-
formation.  Intuition suggests, however, that the rate of intercoder
agreement here (especially on the binomial measurement) is rela-
tively high given the nature of the study.  This might indicate a robust
reliability for the measurement criteria and the coding instrument,
though any such conclusions must be tempered by a recognition that
the coders here were perhaps particularly appropriate for this task.120
Note again that the differences in coding results revealed by these
evaluations were eventually rectified:  those cases were recoded ac-
cording to an agreement between the coders.
E.  Evaluating the Measurement—Criteria II:  Validity
In order to ensure that the study directly measures the informa-
tion we seek—insight into the performance of the Federal Circuit in
building its jurisprudence—the analytic method has been designed to
closely reflect the results of the actual cases.121  That is, the methodo-
logical split identified and quantified here is directly linked to the
outcomes of patent cases, thus allowing for meaningful conclusions to
be drawn from the analysis.122  The relevance of the procedural/
118
Because all intercoder differences were eventually resolved, the final intercoder
agreement was 100%.  Initial agreement was tracked to provide information about the
reliability of the data measurement system and to provide incremental feedback to the
coders and authors concerning the coding instrument.  Infra notes 144-49 and accom-
panying text.
119
Epstein & King noted that their United States Court of Appeals database re-
ported a 95.2% intercoder agreement rate and that while this “seems high,” it pre-
cludes detection of differences of less than 5%.  Epstein & King, supra note 97, at 87
n.272; see also  Sisk et al., supra  note 82, at 1434-35 (noting that the authors had “few”
disagreements on coding, all of which were ultimately resolved).
120
Supra note 117 and accompanying text.
121
Epstein and King refer to this as measurement reliability.  See Epstein & King,
supra note 97, at 83 (defining reliability as “the extent to which it is possible to repli-
cate a measurement, reproducing the same value . . . on the same standard for the
same subject at the same time”).
122
Put another way, if we were instead observing an interesting but ultimately ir-
relevant (as to actual results) distinction within the jurisprudence, then few meaning-
ful conclusions could be drawn about the patterns we identify.
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holistic dichotomy is supported by the following line of reasoning.
First, there is little doubt that claim construction generally, and the
methodological approach to claim construction specifically, is cru-
cially important to patent disputes.  Second, the procedural/holistic
categorization scheme is deeply tied to the patent jurisprudence itself,
having been developed from the “bottom up” to reflect the issues and
arguments that characterize this area of the patent law.  Third, quanti-
tative analysis of the jurisprudence fully supports the view that the
methodology matters.  We conclude that disputes concerning claim
construction found in the jurisprudence itself mostly relate to disputes
concerning methodological approach.
1.  Methodology as a Driver of Claim Construction
The first issue will come as little surprise to students of patent law
jurisprudence:  the methodological approach to claim construction
matters a great deal and is often determinative of the results of a claim
construction analysis.  By extension, this approach typically is disposi-
tive of the outcome of a patent dispute.123  Thus, anything that system-
atically affects claim construction analysis will have a direct effect on
both the actual interpretation of patent claims as well as the legal
status of the patent at issue.  The methodological approach, by estab-
lishing the framework by which claim construction analyses are con-
ducted, is therefore crucial to determining the outcome.
It is important, however, to understand that the choice of meth-
odological approach does not necessarily predict typical generalized
descriptions of claim interpretation results.  For example, even a
strongly procedural approach will yield interpretations that can be de-
scribed as both “broad” and “narrow.”  We note two cases evincing the
same methodological approach (strong procedural).124  In Johnson
Worldwide Associates v. Zebco Corp.,125 the court issued a broad interpre-
tation of the term “coupled” that encompassed both mechanical and
electrical attachments.126  K-2 v. Salomon S.A.,127 however, offered
a “narrow” claim construction:  the phrase “permanently affixed” was
123
See, e.g., Markman I, 52 F.3d 967, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Mayer, J., concurring)
(“All these pages and all these words cannot camouflage what the court well knows:  to
decide what the claims mean is nearly always to decide the case.”).
124
The cases were issued less than five months apart and were joined by two com-
mon judges—including their author, Judge Clevenger.
125
175 F.3d 985 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
126
Id. at 992.
127
191 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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found to exclude attachment mechanisms such as screws.128  More
generally, the methodological approach bears an even less predictable
relationship to descriptions such as “infringed” or “invalid.”  This is
because the results of a claim construction in any particular case do
not predictably relate to the ultimate results of the dispute:  while a
“broader” claim interpretation might imply a broader scope of cover-
age—and thus a greater chance of finding infringement—it also in-
creases the chance that the claim will be found invalid.
Notwithstanding the fact that the procedural/holistic dichotomy
does not map precisely onto a broad/narrow distinction, our intuition
is that the choice of a procedural methodological approach will, over
the long run, yield generally more predictable (and perhaps broader)
claim constructions than would the holistic approach.  Greater pre-
dictability is, we believe, obvious:  definitionally, the procedural ap-
proach, with its emphasis on the ordinary meaning of claim language
as well as on the requirement for specified (and generally limited)
reasons for straying beyond ordinary meaning, allows for far more cer-
tainty concerning the results of claim constructions than the holistic
approach.129  That the procedural methodology will yield broader in-
terpretations rests on more subtle arguments concerning the nature
of these approaches.  In particular, the holistic approach, by offering
substantially greater flexibility, allows more opportunities for judges to
tailor claim construction analyses according to other critical issues in
the case, such as infringement or validity.  The intuition, widely held
in the patent law community, is that the influence of such exogenous
factors will tend toward narrower claim constructions to avoid findings
of either infringement or invalidity.
However, even if one does not share these intuitions concerning
the long-run effects of each methodological approach, there can be
little doubt that, for any particular case, the choice of methodological
approach is likely to be a fundamental driver of the claim construc-
tion and, correspondingly, of the case outcome.
2.  The Reality of the Procedural/Holistic Dichotomy
The second reason we believe the procedural/holistic dichotomy
is linked to results is that this construct was drawn from the cases
128
Id. at 1363-65.
129
As we describe more fully in Part III.C.1, infra, we also find a statistically signifi-
cant relationship between variance in claim construction analysis and the incidence of
the holistic methodological approach.
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themselves, as described in subsection II.B.2.  That is, the categories
were discovered  rather than created—they are a fundamental feature of
patent case law.  To be sure, in order to ensure robust measurement
techniques, the categories were formally named, characterized, and
compartmentalized as part of this project; one will search in vain for
any mention of a “holistic methodological approach” in Federal Cir-
cuit jurisprudence.  Despite differences in nomenclature, however,
the procedural/holistic dichotomy describes, we suggest, the basic
terms of the claim construction debate at the Federal Circuit and be-
yond.130  The court itself seems to recognize this, with citation patterns
neatly reflecting the methodological divide.  Since April 1999, ap-
proximately one-third of opinions in our dataset coded as “strong
procedural” (PS) rely in whole or in part on Johnson Worldwide for
authority; leading opinions during the same timeframe exhibiting a
“strong holistic” (HS) methodology take great pains to distinguish
themselves from and/or reconcile themselves with Johnson World-
wide.131  Thus, the “bottom up” development of the procedural/holis-
tic categorical framework has ensured that the distinction is closely
tied to the jurisprudence.132
3.  Testing the Procedural/Holistic Categories
A final, important assurance that the procedural/holistic categori-
zation reflects real results in the cases comes from the data itself.  In
short, we found that disputes over claim construction outcomes found
in the jurisprudence are overwhelmingly the result of disagreements
concerning methodological approach and are fully captured by our
measurement process.  That is, when judges (whether of the Federal
Circuit or district court variety) disagree about claim construction,
130
See, e.g., Romary & Michelsohn, supra note 15, at 1933.
131
The Johnson Worldwide decision was issued in April 1999.  175 F.3d at 985.  Our
dataset contains 113 opinions since Johnson Worldwide that have been coded PS.
Shepard’s® reports that at least twenty-nine of these opinions explicitly rely on Johnson
Worldwide.  Shepard’s, at  http://www.lexisnexis.com/shepards (last visited Jan. 30,
2004).
Major opinions invoking a strong holistic methodology (coded HS) and distin-
guishing themselves from Johnson Worldwide include Bell Atlantic Network Services, Inc. v.
Covad Communications Group, Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2001), and SciMed Life
Systems v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
132
In addition, this distinction can be viewed as a variation of both the traditional
“rules versus standards” debate and the contest between the textualist and pragmatist
schools of documentary interpretation.  An animating assumption of the rich literature
in each of these areas is that the methodological distinction has crucial, real-world im-
portance.  See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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they do so on the basis of differing methodological approaches (in
our terms, the procedural/holistic categorization scheme).
This conclusion was reached by two separate analytic methods.  In
the first, “alternative” opinions in the dataset were identified, together
with their corresponding “majority” opinion.  (For our purposes, an
“alternative” opinion is defined as a concurrence or dissent that ex-
presses a distinct claim construction outcome—e.g., a different mean-
ing of a disputed term; a “majority” opinion is the opinion of the
court.)133  We find that our coding categories tracked this dispute 95%
of the time (19 of 20) using the detailed categories, or 65% of the
time (13 of 20) according to binomial categories.  That is, 95% (65%
under the far less detailed binomial categorization) of disputes be-
tween Federal Circuit judges over claim construction found in the ju-
risprudence were the result of the differing methodological
approaches described by our measurement scheme.  We view this to
be powerful evidence that the methodological approach to claim con-
struction matters:  it appears to be the genesis of almost all disputes.134
The second analysis involved district court decisions that were par-
tially or fully reversed and remanded by the Federal Circuit on the ba-
sis of claim construction, where the Federal Circuit’s construction was
coded either “strong” or “intermediate” for either category, proce-
dural or holistic (PS, HS, Pi, Hi).
135  Coding the corresponding district
court decisions (where easily available) showed that over 82% of these
erroneous decisions—i.e., those reversed or vacated by the Federal
Circuit—were found so on the basis of a different methodological ap-
proach, according to the binomial procedural/holistic dichotomy.136
A related, broader examination of Federal Circuit opinions discussing
133
Alternative opinions not directed to claim construction issues were omitted
from the dataset.  The dataset contained twenty alternative opinions; about 5% of cases
decided had an alternative opinion.
134
The single case where an alternative opinion exists with the same methodologi-
cal approach as the majority opinion is Optimal Recreation Solutions, LLP v. Leading Edge
Technologies, Inc., No. 00-1339, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 5772 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 6, 2001).  A
review of the dueling opinions in that case (both were coded as PS) makes clear that
the crux of the dispute was over the proper ordinary meaning of a claim term:  specifi-
cally, whether the terms “memory” and “display” evoke structural characteristics.
135
Federal Circuit opinions coded as “weak” (PW, HW) were omitted because of the
difficulty in determining whether the Federal Circuit changed (or intended to change)
the district court’s claim construction analysis.
136
The analysis here reviewed thirty-five available district court opinions (pub-
lished in LEXIS databases).  Of these, only twenty-two contained clear claim construc-
tion analyses, and in five of these, the Federal Circuit affirmed the claim construction.
Fourteen of the seventeen remaining opinions were reversed on the basis of a change
(according to binomial categories) in methodological approach.
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in some detail the corresponding district court’s claim construction
revealed that in at least 75% of the cases reversed, the reversal was
based on the difference in methodological approach, again using bi-
nomial categories.137
Both analyses—disagreements concerning claim construction
within the Federal Circuit and disagreements between the Federal
Circuit and the district courts—strongly support the view that the
methodological approach to claim construction, in particular the
methodological categorization system developed here, matters a great
deal.
F.  Data Collection and Measurement
1.  Selection of Judicial Opinions
The potential population of judicial decisions included all written
Federal Circuit opinions decided from April 23, 1996 through No-
vember 1, 2002.  The first date is when Markman II was decided by the
Supreme Court, and was thus chosen definitionally.138  The latter date
was chosen arbitrarily.
This potential population was reduced according to the selection
criteria, which was that the opinion had to offer an observable patent
claim construction analysis, because without the ability to consider the
court’s expressed analytic approach, there was nothing to measure.
This selection was achieved in a two-step process.  The first was an
electronic database search strategy, which involved repetitively search-
ing the relevant LEXIS139 and Westlaw140 judicial databases using
137
Thirty-nine Federal Circuit cases were analyzed, and twenty-nine appeared to
have reversed the district court on the basis of methodological approach (binomial
categories).  Of the remaining ten, most simply did not provide enough information to
discern what analytical fault existed in claim construction, and two were reversed for
claim construction reasons unrelated to methodology (construing the wrong term, and
selecting the wrong “means” in an analysis based on the “means plus function” format
authorized by 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 6 (2000)).
138
See supra Part I.B (explaining the significance of Markman II).
139
The LEXIS database used is designated “Federal Circuit—US Court of Appeals
Cases” or “CAFC.”  Coverage includes all published and unpublished opinions from
October 1982 to the present, and the file is updated daily.  See LEXIS, at http://
www.lexis.com (last visited Jan. 30, 2004).
140
The major Westlaw database used is designated “U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit Cases” or “CTAF.”  Coverage includes “reported and unreported
documents” from October 1982 to the present.  The update schedule is not specified.
See Westlaw, at  http://www.westlaw.com (last visited Jan. 30, 2004).
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methods and terms calculated to capture all possible opinions that fell
within the selection criteria.141  Most (if not all) of these opinions ap-
peared on multiple results lists; all results were combined and repeti-
tive records deleted.  In addition, clearly inapplicable records were
deleted at this phase (e.g., case titles of the form “[Party] v. [Secretary
of Veterans Affairs]”).  After this stage of the selection process, the
population of cases numbered over 750.  Cases that, upon examina-
tion, did not meet the population criteria were set aside.142  The total
number of opinions in the dataset is 413.143
In addition, the “United States Patent Quarterly” or “USPQ” database, also located
in Westlaw, was used for some searches.  Id.
141
For example, the collection strategies included the following:
1. In the LEXIS “Federal Circuit—US Court of Appeals Cases” database:
(“claim construction” or (claim /2 construction) or “claim interpretation” or (claim
/3 interpretation) or (interpretation /3 claim)).
2. In the Westlaw “United States Patent Quarterly” database:  classification
codes 125.1305, 125.1303, or 120.03 restricted to the Federal Circuit and the pe-
riod April 23, 1996 to November 1, 2002.
3. The Markman I and II decisions were “Shepardized” (a LEXIS function)
for citation in the Federal Circuit during the relevant time period.
142
Note that opinions containing claim construction analysis in the context of ap-
peals brought from the PTO Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences were not  in-
cluded in the population.  This is because the claim construction scheme for unissued
patents is distinct (at least as a doctrinal matter) from that of issued patents and in-
volves largely distinct precedent and criteria.  Specifically, the PTO is expected to give
proposed claims their “broadest reasonable construction,” purportedly to ensure the
broad applicability of the prior art.  See, e.g., In re Graves, 69 F.3d 1147, 1152 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (upholding the PTO’s broad reading of a claim); In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 858
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (affirming the appropriate standard as giving claims their
“broadest reasonable interpretation”).  While there is at least some question whether
the “broadest reasonable” metric might be de facto comparable to the framework es-
tablished by the Federal Circuit when reviewing district court decisions, see Duffy, supra
note 10, at 127 (downplaying any distinction), the reasoning and relevant precedents
are sufficiently distinct so as to make these opinions inappropriate for inclusion in this
study population.  The authors estimate that the total number of opinions affected by
this exclusion was under twenty.
A significant number of claim construction analyses involving 35 U.S.C. § 112,
para. 6 (2000) were excluded for similar reasons:  the identification of structure in the
specification that “corresponds” to claim function is clearly a distinct inquiry.  On the
other hand, an interpretation of the claimed function in a § 112, para. 6 claim element
is a traditional claim construction inquiry and opinions addressing these issues were
included in the dataset.
143
Concurrences and dissents were included in the dataset as separate observa-
tions if they otherwise complied with the selection criteria.  Overall analyses of the
court’s jurisprudence omitted these records; the dataset included 393 opinions for the
court.
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2.  Coding Judicial Opinions
As previously noted, each opinion in the initial dataset was inde-
pendently coded by two readers according to the expressed methodo-
logical approach of the opinion.144  The readers’ coding included the
subcategories; the binomial coding was taken directly from the sub-
category score.145  Each opinion that contained an observable claim
construction analysis was individually coded; thus, dissents, concur-
rences, and other nonmajority opinions were treated as separate ob-
servations when they met the criteria of observable claim construction
analysis.146
The methodological coding scores were entered directly into
spreadsheet software packages by the readers to avoid data entry er-
rors.  In addition to the coding scores, the following information was
collected for each opinion in the dataset:147
• Case name/title/parties
• Federal Circuit docket number
• Date issued
• Disposition of appeal
• Citation(s)148
• Type of opinion (sole/majority/alternate)
• Panel judges (names)
• Judges joining the opinion (names)
• Authoring judge (names)149
The data was collected and analyzed using off-the-shelf statistical and
database software.150
144
While each opinion is obviously unique, the readers estimated that the coding
process took, on average, approximately ten to fifteen minutes per opinion.
145
Again, “binomial” refers to whether the opinion expressed a holistic or proce-
dural methodological approach, irrespective of the strength of the form.  That is, to
determine the binomial coding scores, the subcategories were collapsed:  opinions
coded as containing strong, intermediate, or weak forms of the holistic methodology
are all coded holistic in the binomial measurement scheme.  See supra Part II.C (ex-
plaining the classification scheme).
146
Separate opinions on non-claim construction topics were ignored.
147
Again, in an effort to minimize data entry problems and to avoid the need for
manual proofreading of the entire dataset, this information was collected solely elec-
tronically, using specially written software scripts to collect and allocate the data from
standard electronic LEXIS and Westlaw files.
148
The LEXIS citation was collected for all opinions.  Where available, the Federal
Reporter citation was collected as well.
149
Opinions without a signing judge were coded “per curiam” for the author.
150
Microsoft Excel 2002 for Mac OS X was the primary data management tool;
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III.  STUDY RESULTS
Analysis of the collected data is split into three general categories.
The first looks at the observed methodological approach evinced by
the court as a whole during the period of the study.  The second
evaluates whether there are any discernible trends over time.  The
third considers the observed methodological approach of the individ-
ual judges on the Federal Circuit to determine whether opinion
authorship or panel membership is related to expressed methodology.
A.  Overall Results 151
Table 2 describes the overall frequency distribution of the Federal
Circuit’s claim construction methodologies since Markman II, where
the methodological approach is expressed in binomial form—that is,
where the strong/intermediate/weak categories are collapsed.
Table 2:  Frequency of Methodologies (binomial, n=393)
procedural holistic
 n 248 145
 % 63.1% 36.9%
Table 2 suggests that the procedural methodology is predominant,
though perhaps not overwhelmingly.152
Figure 2 breaks out the categorical details, with the score for each
methodological approach indicated as a percentage of the observa-
tions (court:  n=393, alternative:  n=20) and as a numeric total.  Figure
2 includes the profile of the alternative opinions for comparison pur-
poses.
statistical analyses were conducted with the assistance of SPSS 11.0 (2002).  Graphing
was done in Excel.
151
Unless otherwise specified, the results in the following Section reflect opinions
written for the court only; alternative opinions (dissents, concurrences) in the dataset
were otherwise omitted.
152
Overall observations (including alternative opinions) had the following profile
(n=413):
procedural holistic
n 259 154
% 62.7% 37.3%
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Figure 2:  Frequency Distribution of Methodologies (Categorical)
The strong form of the procedural methodology was observed
more than twice as often as any other methodological approach, fol-
lowed by the strong form of holistic, and then the intermediate form
of procedural.  The general shape of the histogram (ordered accord-
ing to the taxonomy noted in Figure 1) suggests that the court’s
methodological approach tends to be somewhat polar, favoring
stronger expressions of methodology.
B.  Methodological Trends over Time
The time period for this study spanned about six-and-a-half years,
from April 1996 to November 2002.  Accordingly, it was possible to
evaluate the court’s methodological approach over time and to con-
sider whether any trends might be discernible.
Because opinions are not issued by the Federal Circuit at a uni-
form rate, utilizing calendar-related criteria to separate the series of
opinions resulted in widely varying groups of opinions.  To offset this
problem, the dataset was separated into twenty-two bins in chrono-
logical order, with each bin representing approximately two to four
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months during the period of the study.  Each bin contains eighteen or
nineteen opinions.153
1.  Overall Trends
Figure 3 shows the methodology (binomial categorization) over
time, expressed in terms of the percentage of holistic observations.
Figure 3:  Methodology over Time (Binomial)
The downward-sloping trend line superimposed on the graph in-
dicates that the frequency of the holistic methodological approach
(when categorized in binomial form) tended to decrease during the
period of the study.154
In an effort to produce a clearer picture of the real trends at
the Federal Circuit, Figure 4 digs somewhat deeper into the data by
153
Bin selection and separation was done on the basis of the overall dataset, in-
cluding alternative opinions.  Considering opinions for the court alone, bin size varies
from sixteen to nineteen.
154
The trend line was calculated according to the ordinary least squares (OLS)
procedure. The slope of the trend line (m) is –0.672%.  The square of Pearson’s prod-
uct moment (or coefficient of correlation r 2 ) is 0.144, indicating some (though rela-
tively weak) correlation between the period and percentage of holistic observations.
The t-value (t) for the slope is 1.84, which indicates that the slope is statistically signifi-
cant at the 95% level (p ≤ .05).
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depicting the frequency trends of both strong and weak methodologi-
cal approaches (irrespective of whether such approaches were proce-
dural or holistic) during the period of the study.
Figure 4:  Proportion of Strong/Weak Approaches over Time
Again, trend lines were superimposed on the graph.155  The strik-
ing result here is the marked increase in the “extremism” of the Fed-
eral Circuit during the period of the study:  moving from near parity
between strong and weak forms of methodological approach in early
periods to a jurisprudence increasingly characterized by strong forms
of analysis.  Note that one byproduct of this increasing extremism is
likely to be an increasing reversal rate over time because lower courts
may be unable to determine the proper approach and/or the Federal
Circuit may become less forgiving of alternative methodologies.  This
observation is supported by Chu’s results showing an increasing rate
of claim construction changes over time.156
155 Both trend lines are reasonably correlated and statistically significant.  For the
% strong data:  m = 1.488%, r2 = 0.350, t = 3.218, p ≤ .005.  For the % holistic data:
m = -1.360%, r2 = 0.286, t = 2.833, p ≤ 0.01.
156
Chu found that there was a statistically significant increase in the rate that the
Federal Circuit changed claim constructions over time.  Chu, supra note 10, at 1102.
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2.  Authorship Activity Patterns
The significant rise in methodological extremism revealed by Fig-
ure 4 suggested further analysis of the data.  Using the statistical pro-
files developed for each judge,157 the trends in Figures 3 and 4 were
deconstructed by analyzing changes in Federal Circuit judicial activity.
First, two groups of judges were identified according to their statistical
profile as Proceduralists (i.e., those most likely to author opinions stat-
ing a procedural methodological approach) or Holistics (i.e., those
most likely to author opinions stating a holistic methodological ap-
proach).158  The percentage of Federal Circuit opinions authored by
each group was calculated for each period in the study.  The author-
ship activity trend for the Proceduralists was found to be strongly posi-
tive and statistically significant.159  Figure 5 depicts this result.
Figure 5:  Trends of Opinion Authorship Activity
Note, however, that Chu’s population covered only a twenty-eight-month subset of this
study.  Id. at 1092.
157
See infra Part III.C (describing the statistical profiles of each Federal Circuit
judge’s claim construction decisions).
158
Proceduralists are those whose standardized M-index (a constructed measure
of overall methodological approach) score places them outside one standard deviation
below the mean score; Holistics are those whose standardized M-index score places
them outside one standard deviation above the mean score.  See infra notes 170-74 and
accompanying text for a detailed discussion of the M-index and grouping assignments.
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The downward-sloping line (% holistic) is the court’s overall trend
line taken from Figure 3.  The trend line for Proceduralist author ac-
tivity (% p authored) is relatively well-correlated and statistically signifi-
cant.160
Figure 5 reveals a major part of the answer posed by Figure 3:  the
Federal Circuit’s claim construction jurisprudence becomes more
procedural over time in large part because of the increasing author-
ship activity of the Proceduralist judges.  A major factor in this in-
crease in activity has been changes in judicial personnel:  of the three
judges defined as Proceduralists, only one was on the court through-
out the period of the study; the remaining two joined the court
after January 1, 2000.161  The superimposed trendlines for the first and
second half of the study reveal a sharp inflection point around mid-
2000, which is when Judges Linn and Dyk (two of the three Proce-
duralists) began hearing cases.
While Figure 5 explains the decreasing incidence of the holistic
methodological approach at the Federal Circuit, it does not offer
much insight into the increasing extremism of the Federal Circuit de-
picted in Figure 4.  Figure 6, however, depicts the authorship trends
of a group of judges that fit within a definition of “strong” authors—
those whose opinions were coded as evincing a strong methodological
approach (irrespective of whether procedural or holistic) and fall
within the top quartile of this statistic for all judges.
159
For % p authored:  m = 1.413%,r2 = 0.477, t = 4.259, p ≤ 0.0001.  The authorship
activity trend for the Holistic group (% holistic) was found to be stable (slope ≈ 0) but
statistically insignificant.
160
For % p authored:  m = 1.548%, r2 = 0.577, t = 5.232, p ≤ 0.0001.
For % h authored:  m = -0.693%, r2 = 0.135, t = 1.769, p ≤ 0.05.
161
The Proceduralists
Judge Years in Dataset # Opinions
Clevenger all 48
Linn 2000–end 21
Dyk 2000–end 14
The Holistics
Judge Years in Dataset # Opinions
Newman all 28
Lourie all 58
Bryson all 29
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Figure 6:  Opinion Authorship Activity of “Strong” Authors
The trend line in Figure 6 suggests that the activity of “strong”
authors on the Federal Circuit increased, perhaps by five-fold, during
the period of the study.162  Again, a large part of this can be attributed
to personnel changes:  two of the five judges classified as “strong”
authors joined the court after January 1, 2000.163  Combined, they ac-
count for 45% of all “strong” opinions authored.
To briefly summarize, the results over time show the following key
trends:
Trend 1: A gradual but significant shift in methodological ap-
proach to claim construction away from holistic, in favor
162
For % by “strong” authors: m = 1.162%, r2 = 0.305, t = 2.966, p ≤ 0.05.
163
“Strong” Authors
Judge Years in Dataset # Opinions
Friedman all 1
Mayer all 8
Schall all 27
Linn 2000–end 21
Dyk 2000–end 14
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of the procedural approach (Figure 3).
Trend 2: A substantial increase in the extremism of the Federal
Circuit’s claim construction jurisprudence, measured by
the frequency of “strong” methodological approaches
(Figure 4).
In both cases, changes in court personnel seem to be at the core of
the developments.  Trend 1 is largely explained by the increasing ac-
tivity of Proceduralist judges—a factor substantially driven by the addi-
tion of Judges Linn and Dyk to the court in 2000.  Similarly, Trend 2
results in large part from the increasing authorship activity of judges
with a propensity to write “strong” methodological opinions, a factor
again influenced by the arrival of Judges Linn and Dyk.
From an institutional evaluation perspective, these results are
mixed.  While Trend 1 (Figure 3) demonstrates a movement towards
proceduralism, it nonetheless makes clear that the holistic methodo-
logical approach remains a current (and apparently enduring) feature
of the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence.  This in turn suggests that the
methodological split noted in Part IV.A is likely to remain for the
foreseeable future, thereby reducing the predictability and stability of
the jurisprudence and potentially keeping the district court reversal
rate at relatively high levels.
Trend 2 (Figure 4) offers an arguably more positive view of the ju-
risprudential developments.  Here, there are two plausible stories.
The first is that the marked increase in extremism is evidence of an
ongoing doctrinal struggle over claim construction at the Federal Cir-
cuit, where the addition of Proceduralist judges such as Linn and Dyk
has spurred their Holistic brethren ( Judges Bryson and Lourie) to
adopt a more aggressive approach.  This view is less compelling, how-
ever, when one considers the relatively low rate of disputes concern-
ing claim construction that appear in the jurisprudence; the
population contains only about a 5% rate of alternative claim con-
struction opinions (as expressed in dissents or concurrences).164
Thus, the more plausible story related to Trend 2 is that the Fed-
eral Circuit is indeed responding to the Markman II mandate by in-
creasingly focusing on—and developing—claim construction guide-
lines.  Thus, the trend towards polarization is a byproduct of the
clearer and sharper ways by which the court is analyzing claims (or,
more precisely, expressing its analysis of them).  While part of this
164
Of the total opinion population of 413, twenty opinions are alternative claim
construction analyses.
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development seems to have been a move towards the procedural
forms of analysis, the more significant observation may be that the
court is attempting to fulfill the Markman II requirement of a coherent
doctrine of claim construction.  Under this view, the jurisprudence
prior to Markman II may have been relatively less clear or evinced rela-
tively weaker forms of analysis, and the important shift is the increase
in stronger (and thus more clearly stated) methodological forms.
Whichever explanation one chooses—a struggle for supremacy
over claim construction methodology or the expected result of doc-
trinal development—the trends generally support the view that the
Federal Circuit is (1) increasingly focusing on the methodological ap-
proach to claim construction and (2) gradually moving to a more uni-
fied (procedural) methodological scheme.165  Both of these must be
considered broadly positive developments, likely to move the Federal
Circuit closer to its mandate of uniformity and predictability.
C.  The Methodology of Federal Circuit Judges
This Section develops a detailed statistical profile of each Federal
Circuit judge with respect to his or her expressed claim construction
methodology.  This information is useful in evaluating how different
judges approach the task of the Federal Circuit, as well as in illustrat-
ing the internal debates and tensions on the court.
1.  Descriptive Data
Table 3 presents basic descriptive data for each of the sixteen
Federal Circuit judges included in the dataset, listed in order by num-
ber of opinions joined.166
165
Note that these trends, of course, do not suggest that the reversal rate of dis-
trict court opinions is likely to drop, thus confirming the results of Chu and Moore.
See Chu, supra note 10, at 1102 (showing an increase in Federal Circuit reversals of dis-
trict court claim construction decisions over a twenty-eight-month period since the be-
ginning of 1998); Moore, supra note 14, at 11 (finding that the Federal Circuit
reversed district court claim constructions in 33% of all appealed patent cases between
Markman II and the end of 2000).  As the Federal Circuit wrestles with its own juris-
prudence, the district courts are likely to (a) have difficulty in discerning the appro-
priate mode of claim construction analysis and/or (b) face reversal because of the
relatively fluid nature of the Federal Circuit’s guidelines.  Moving targets are difficult
to hit, and the results here seem to suggest that the court is creating such a moving
target with respect to claim construction methodology.
166
A judge was considered to have joined an opinion if he or she either auth-
ored or joined the decision of the court without a concurrence or dissent.  Authors of
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Table 3:  Federal Circuit Judges in Dataset
Judge
Years in
Dataset
Opinions
Joined
Opinions
Authored
Alt. Rate
Clevenger (RC) all 109 48 6.3%
Rader (RR) all 106 48 6.3%
Schall (AS) all 103 27 3.7%
Lourie (AL) all 101 58 1.7%
Newman (PN) all 100 28 7.1%
Bryson (WB) all 97 29 3.4%
Gajarsa (AG) 1997–end 92 31 3.2%
Mayer (RM) all 90 8 50.0%
Michel (PM) all 83 27 7.4%
Plager (JP)† all 63 11 0.0%
Rich (GR)†† start–1999 51 18 0.0%
Dyk (TD) 2000–end 40 14 0.0%
Linn (RL) 2000–end 39 21 4.8%
Archer (GA)† all 35 12 0.0%
Friedman (DF)† all 30 1 100.0%
Prost (SP) 2001–end 8 3 0.0%
per curiam N/A – 29 –
†  Inactive status as of June 2003.
†† Died May 1999.
Note that twelve judges were on active status as of June 2003.  The
column labeled “Alt. Rate” indicates the proportion of alternative
opinions authored by the judge as a percentage of total opinions
authored.  Among the twelve active judges, the average rate of alterna-
tive opinions is 7.8%, with Judge Mayer appearing especially active on
this front with a 50% rate.167
alternative opinions (concurrences or dissents) were considered to have joined the
alternative opinions.
167
Note that Judge Mayer authored proportionally far fewer claim construction
opinions than did his colleagues.
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2.  Judicial Methodology
Next we turn to measurements of the judges’ methodological ap-
proaches.  To get an intuitive sense of the range of differences, Figure
7 displays the frequency of judges in the dataset to write (and join)
opinions of either procedural or holistic methodology, expressed as a
percentage of opinions coded as holistic.168  Judges are sorted in as-
cending order, with the lowest values (most procedural) to the left.169
Figure 7:  The Methodology of Federal Circuit Judges
(% holistic)
The overall mean percentage of holistic opinions is 38.1% for the
author data, and 35.9% for the panelist data.
Note that, as intuition suggests, judges appear less “extreme” in
the panelist data, with a total range of 31.0% (17.5% to 48.5%) versus
a total range of 61.9% (7.1% to 69.0%) for the author data.  That is,
judges appear to relax their preferences somewhat when joining opin-
ions, and authors appear to enjoy a degree of latitude when describ-
ing the methodological approach in their own opinions.  In addition,
and perhaps more importantly, the distribution of the data (shown by
168
Judges Friedman and Prost are not displayed in Figure 7 because their signifi-
cantly smaller sample sizes obscured the overall results.
169
Note that [pc] represents unsigned (per curiam) opinions.  Obviously, there is
no panelist data for [pc].
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the curved line superimposed on Figure 7, with steep slopes near each
end and a flattened curve near the mean) suggests that the judges on
the court can usefully be thought of as groups.  The three to four
judges at each end of the chart are markedly more extreme than the
bulk nearer the middle, thereby creating three groups or factions.
3.  Factions on the Federal Circuit
We next describe the groups or factions of the Federal Circuit
identified in Figure 7.  First, to more precisely evaluate the judges’
methodological approaches, a calculated index (denoted M-index) was
developed.170  The advantage of the M-index over the cruder binomial
percentages of Figure 7 is that it captures (with a single number) the
propensity of a judge to author or join opinions exhibiting a proce-
dural or holistic methodological approach, as well as reflects the
strength of reasoning utilized.  It does this by weighting opinions ac-
cording to strength of methodology, as well as measuring the general
categorical form (procedural/holistic).  M-index scores range from 0
to 1, with a score of 1 indicating a perfectly strong holistic (Hs) ap-
proach, and 0 indicating a perfectly strong procedural (Ps) ap-
proach.171
Table 4 reports the results of the M-index calculation, and groups
the judges into one of three categories.172  Proceduralists are those
whose standardized M-index score173 places them outside one standard
170
This index is loosely based on an index developed by Professors Segal and
Cover for describing the political leanings of Supreme Court justices, based on cate-
gorical data (there, coded newspaper editorials describing the justices).  Jeffrey A. Se-
gal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 557, 559 (1989); see also King & Epstein, supra note 97, at 82, 90-92 (dis-
cussing the Segal/Cover index extensively).
171
The equation used is:           












+++++
−+−+−



= +− 1
)(
10
1)(
2
1)(
2
1
wPwHiPiHsPsH
wPwHiPiHsPsH
nnnnnn
nnnnnn
indexM
where nx represents the number of opinions attributable to that judge (i.e., either
authored or joined) coded for a particular methodological approach.  Note that in-
termediate and weak opinions are weighted 1/2 and 1/10 of strong opinions, respec-
tively, representing judgments about the relative impact of each form of
methodological approach.
172
Table 4 uses authorship data (n=413).  The reasoning is that the authorship
data best represents the judges’ true preferences and is thus most appropriate for in-
terjudge comparisons.
173
A standardized score refers to the difference between the raw score (here,
the M-index) and the mean score, expressed in terms of standard deviations.  That is, a
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deviation below the mean score; Holistics are those whose standard-
ized M-index score places them outside one standard deviation above
the mean score.174  The Swing Judges are those remaining.
Table 4:  Categories of Federal Circuit Judges175
Judge
M-index
(authors) Std. Score
Dyk 0.121 (1.79)
Clevenger 0.199 (1.25)Proceduralists
Linn 0.202 (1.22)
Rader 0.334 (0.30)
Michel 0.335 (0.30)
Mayer 0.344 (0.24)
[pc] 0.367 (0.07)
Gajarsa 0.369 (0.06)
Archer 0.379 0.01
Plager 0.386 0.06
Schall 0.406 0.19
Swing Judges
Rich 0.428 0.35
Lourie 0.542 1.14
Bryson 0.619 1.68Holistics
Newman 0.636 1.80
Table 4 sets forth a descriptive account of claim construction
at the Federal Circuit:  that the methodological approach of the court
is split rather cleanly among three groups.  As has been the case
throughout the analysis, Table 4 highlights the importance of person-
nel changes at the Federal Circuit:  two of the three most recent
standardized score of 1 describes a case where the individual M-index is one standard
deviation above the mean score.
174
The validity of this assignment criteria can be seen in the “Std. Score” column
of Table 4:  very significant gaps exist in the judges’ distribution at those locations.
175
Judges Friedman and Prost were not included in the grouping analysis because
of very low sample sizes.
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additions to the court, Judges Linn and Dyk, are solid Procedural-
ists.176  All Proceduralists and Holistics are currently in active status.
This identification of the methodological camps within the Fed-
eral Circuit offers the opportunity to investigate the impact that these
groups of judges have on the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence.177  One
aspect of the analysis was discussed in Part IV.B:  this grouping seems
to explain many of the overall trends observed in this study.
4.  Judicial (In)consistency
As a final judge-specific analysis, the methodological variance of
the Federal Circuit judges was calculated.  This result allows some
comparative insight into the consistency (or lack thereof) of individ-
ual judges’ methodological approaches to claim construction.  Vari-
ance was calculated according to the standard deviation of each
judge’s authored opinions on a binomial basis.  Thus, this statistic
measured the propensity of a judge to vary between procedural and
holistic methodologies.  Table 5 reports this result, with the judges
ordered from least variable (i.e., least likely to vary between methodo-
logical approaches) to most.
176
Judge Prost, the most recent addition, was not included in the grouping analy-
sis because of a small sample size:  three authored opinions in the dataset.  All of these
opinions were procedural.
177
Infra Part III.D.
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Table 5:  Methodological Variance of Federal Circuit Judges
Rank Judge Variance
1 Dyk 0.267
2 Clevenger 0.357
3 Linn 0.402
mean 0.463
4 Michel 0.465
5 Bryson 0.471
6 Rader 0.476
7 Gajarsa 0.486
8 Schall 0.492
9 per curiam 0.494
10 Newman 0.497
11 Rich 0.502
12 Lourie 0.504
13 Plager 0.505
14 Archer 0.515
15 Mayer 0.518
The striking observation flowing from Table 5 is the separation
between the least variable judges (Dyk, Clevenger, and Linn) and the
relatively more clustered remainder.  In other words, it appears that
most Federal Circuit judges have relatively similar levels of inconsis-
tency in claim construction methodology, but a small group is sub-
stantially more consistent.  Further, this consistent group overlaps
perfectly with the Proceduralist group identified in Table 4, suggest-
ing (1) a relationship between methodological approach and consis-
tency,178 and (2) the impact of the Proceduralists on the Federal
Circuit’s claim construction doctrine.
Table 5’s implications for overall judicial performance are some-
what unclear—absent a well-defined baseline, it is difficult to know
whether these scores are relatively consistent or inconsistent in the
realm of methodological approaches.  One thing does seem clear,
however:  it is possible for most Federal Circuit judges to substantially
reduce their variability.  Judges Dyk, Clevenger, and Linn seem to
178
For a discussion of this relationship and its implications, see infra Part IV.A.
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have done a markedly better job on this front, and provide something
of a roadmap for the rest of the court to follow.
D.  Predicting the Federal Circuit:  Panel and Author
Dependency in Claim Construction
The final set of results explores the relationships between the
Federal Circuit judges assigned to a case and the methodological ap-
proach to claim construction used for the analysis.179  We find, con-
trary to at least one judge’s assertions,180 that the individual
membership and overall composition of a three-judge panel that de-
cides an appeal has a statistically significant effect on the methodo-
logical approach used to analyze claim construction issues.  Indeed, in
some cases, we can attach specific probabilities to this relationship at a
95% confidence level.  In short, we find ample evidence of panel de-
pendency in claim construction at the Federal Circuit.181
1.  Panel Membership and Methodology
First, we find that the empanelling of many (though not all) Fed-
eral Circuit judges in our dataset has a statistically significant effect on
the claim construction analysis.  In the analysis that follows, we find
that we can predict, with statistically significant confidence, the impact
of the methodological approach of half (6 of 12) of the active judges
of the Federal Circuit.
179
At least one study has shown that the identity of the author of an opinion can
influence the result.  See  John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, How Federal Circuit Judges
Vote in Patent Validity Cases, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 745, 757 (2000) (finding a strong
correlation between the identity of the authoring judge and whether the decision up-
held the validity of a patent).  Other studies have found no such relationship.  See, e.g.,
Chu, supra note 10, at 1115-19 (finding no significant relationship between rate of re-
versal and authorship).
180
There has been fairly widespread criticism of the Federal Circuit among practi-
tioners of patent law that the court’s decisions and reasoning are highly dependent
upon the composition of any individual panel and/or dependent upon the identity of
the authoring judge.  See, e.g., Paul R. Michel, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Must Evolve to Meet the Challenges Ahead, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1177, 1191 (1999).  Judge
Michel’s reply to this criticism was:  “I believe that these complaints are exaggerated.
By informal monitoring, I estimate that in ninety percent of the cases the result would
be the same with any combination of three judges from among the court’s present
complement of ten judges in full-time service.”  Id.
181
Note that, contrary to many observers, we do not necessarily conclude that
panel dependency is undesirable.  Indeed, by allowing an increase in the predictability
of Federal Circuit decision making, it may be broadly beneficial.  For a full discussion
of the implications of panel dependency, see infra Parts IV.B.1–3.
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Binary logistic regression analysis was used to model the relation-
ship between judicial identity and methodological approach (bino-
mial categories).  Logistic regression is particularly well-suited to this
form of analysis, as it is highly effective at estimating the probability
that an event will occur given certain parameters.  The dependent
variable of interest here is binary:  whether an opinion exhibits a ho-
listic (score=1) or procedural (score=0) methodological approach.
Our independent variables are the identities of the judges.182  Table 6
shows the results of the regression on panel data, with statistically sig-
nificant results highlighted.
182
Panel composition data was recoded into a series of binary dummy variables
(0,1) indicating whether a particular judge joined or authored an opinion.
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Table 6:  Panel Membership and Methodological Approach183
Judge B S.E.  exp(B)
Holistic
Probability
Dyk -1.368 0.441** 0.254 20.3%
Clevenger -1.020 0.250** 0.361 26.5%
Linn -0.894 0.397** 0.409 29.0%
Prost -0.674 0.865 0.509 33.7%
Rader -0.486 0.234** 0.615 38.1%
Schall -0.446 0.237* 0.64 39.0%
Gajarsa -0.294 0.255 0.746 42.7%
Rich -0.281 0.319 0.755 43.0%
Mayer -0.166 0.244 0.847 45.9%
Michel -0.025 0.255 0.975 49.4%
Newman 0.157 0.228 1.171 53.9%
Lourie 0.365 0.229 1.441 59.0%
Bryson 0.589 0.234** 1.801 64.3%
* = significance at .10
** = significance at .05
183
The regression was performed using binary logistic regression.  The dependent
variable was the methodology (1,0), and the independent variables (16) were dummy
variables representing panel membership (1,0) for all judges in the dataset.  No con-
stant was included in the model.
Summary statistics for the model are:
-2 Log likelihood
Cox & Snell
R Square
Nagelkerke
R Square
499.592 0.162 0.216
Currently inactive judges are not displayed in Table 6, though their data was included
in the model.  None of their coefficients were statistically significant.
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In Table 6, B represents the coefficient associated with the judge’s
membership on a panel:  positive numbers indicate an increased
probability of a holistic opinion.  The column labeled S.E. reports the
standard error for the coefficient; the level of significance of the coef-
ficient B is indicated. For our purposes, values of less than 0.1 were
deemed significant, indicating a greater than 90% likelihood that the
coefficient is not attributable to chance.  The exp(B) column is the
odds-ratio of the coefficient, the change in odds that the event will oc-
cur (here, a holistic opinion) given a unit increase in the independent
variable (here, the participation of the judge).  Put more simply, the
odds-ratio reports the change in odds that an opinion will be holistic
as a result of the judge joining the opinion.  Finally, the Holistic Prob-
ability column reports the probability (in percentage terms) of a ho-
listic opinion, given the judge’s participation.184  For example, Judge
Bryson’s participation implies a 64.3% chance of a holistic methodo-
logical approach, while Judge Dyk’s participation suggests only a
20.3% chance.
2.  Dependency and Factions
Next, we report the expressed claim construction methodology
given the participation of Proceduralist or Holistic judges on the
panel.
184
Probability = odds/(1+odds).
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Table 7:  Proceduralists, Holistics, and Methodology
Opinion Methodology
Procedural Holistic
0
121
(54.3%)
102
(45.7%)
1
107
(71.3%)
43
(28.7%)
2
17
(100.0%)
–
Number of
Proceduralist
judges
empanelled185
3 – –
0
114
(78.1%)
32
(21.9%)
1
107
(54.3%)
90
(45.7%)
2
24
(53.3%)
21
(46.7%)
Number of
Holistic
judges
empanelled186
3 –
2
(100.0%)
Overall Results
245
(62.8%)
145
(37.2%)
Table 7 reports the contours of the relationship between the
number of Proceduralist or Holistic judges empanelled in a given case
and the methodological outcome.  The data reveals that a greater par-
ticipation of Proceduralist judges resulted in a greater frequency of a
procedural approach to claim construction.  Similarly, a greater par-
ticipation of Holistic judges yielded a greater likelihood of a holistic
approach.  These relationships are statistically significant, meaning we
can reject the hypothesis that they occurred by chance.
Even a cursory glance at the cell values in Table 7 suggests that the
participation of Proceduralist judges is particularly important to the
185 For this portion of the table, χ2 = 21.712, df = 2, p ≤ 0.001.
186
 For this portion of the table, χ2 = 25.775, df = 3, p ≤ 0.001.
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claim construction methodology.  In all cases where Proceduralist
judges comprised a majority of the three-judge panel (17 cases), the
resulting opinion was procedural in nature; the procedural rate was
71.3% when only a single Proceduralist was on the panel (150 cases).
In contrast, the Holistics appear to have a somewhat lesser effect, even
when in the majority.
These results imply that parties appealing to the Federal Circuit
can draw some statistically significant inferences about the outcome of
a claim construction analysis given a known panel membership.187  Of
course, an important limitation to any such inferential analysis is that
the data here represent past  judicial behavior patterns.  For such in-
formation to be meaningful, one must assume that such patterns will
continue into the future.  This assumption may not hold:  one might
expect judges to alter their views or, perhaps, to write opinions more
clearly.  Indeed, a major goal of this Article is to encourage Federal
Circuit judges to take the methodological approach to claim construc-
tion seriously.  Thus, in a sense, if this Article succeeds, the results may
actually diminish in real-world predictive value.
3.  Dependency, Factions, and Panels
Of course, describing the results in terms of individual judges’
membership on a panel potentially misses some of the richness and
nuance that attends the interpersonal dynamics between the judges.
Therefore, we developed a series of ten dummy panels, using the
three-group categories (procedural, holistic, and swing) noted above.
(Using each of the 220 real panels was impractical.)188  The dummy
panels described a three-member panel in terms of the judicial fac-
tions:  for example, procedural, procedural, and swing (denoted PPS).
Figure 8 depicts the frequency with which these panels used each
methodological approach.
187
See infra Part IV.B for the policy implications of this result.
188
Given a set of twelve active judges (n), with three-judge panels (k), the formula
)!(!
!
knk
nx
−
=  yields the possible combinations (x).
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Figure 8:  Frequency of Methodological Approach, Dummy Panels
As expected, panels dominated by Proceduralist members are far
more likely to evince a procedural approach than those dominated by
Holistics.
4.  The Institutional Implications of Panel Dependency
Subsections 1 and 2 demonstrate rather forcefully that Federal
Circuit claim construction analysis is related in a statistically significant
way to the composition of the panel of judges that hears and decides
the case.  To many observers, this will come as little surprise—as noted
above, panel dependency is an oft-repeated criticism of the Federal
Circuit.189
Note, however, that the institutional implications of panel de-
pendency are not themselves necessarily troubling.  Panel dependency
implies some predictability in Federal Circuit behavior and predict-
ability is, of course, both a generally positive development and a par-
ticular mandate for the Federal Circuit.  In addition, many readers
may review the results of subsections 1 and 2 and conclude that the
189
See, e.g., Michel, supra note 180, at 1191 (describing the problem of panel de-
pendency).
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judges identified with a particular theory of claim construction (Pro-
ceduralists, Holistics, etc.) are impeding the Federal Circuit’s institu-
tional mandate as the manager of patent law.  This critique, however,
is misplaced:  those judges whom we find to have a predictable (at
least within our dataset) effect on claim construction are benefiting
the court, not harming it.  Indeed, in our view, subsections 1 and 2 are
something of an indictment of those judges whose statistical profile
indicates no predictable effect on the approach to claim construction;
it is these judges who seem to be major contributors to the perceived
unpredictability of the Federal Circuit.
IV.  SUCCESS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT:  THE IMPLICATIONS
AND SOME POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS
The study presented above offers a number of important insights
into both the institutional design of the U.S. Patent System and its
implementation.  The major findings include:
1. The Federal Circuit’s claim construction jurisprudence evin-
ces a distinct split in methodological approach, a dichotomy
that both involves a significant number of decisions and ap-
pears to affect the results of the cases.
a. The Federal Circuit uses a procedural methodological ap-
proach in 63.1% of the cases in our dataset and a holistic
methodological approach in the remaining 36.9%.
b. “Strong” forms of each methodological approach are the
most common observations in the dataset.
2. During the period of the study, the procedural methodologi-
cal approach became more prevalent.
a. This trend appears to be driven in large part by a substan-
tial increase in authorship activity among judges whose
statistical profile indicates a strong preference for the pro-
cedural methodological approach (the Proceduralists).
b. The rise of Proceduralist activity appears strongly related
to the addition of new judges to the Federal Circuit in
2000.
3. The Federal Circuit’s claim construction jurisprudence be-
came more polarized, with an increasing trend towards strong
methodological approaches, and a decreasing trend towards
weak approaches.
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a. This trend can be explained, in part, by an increase
in activity among judges that frequently author “strong”
opinions of either methodological approach.
4. The methodological approaches of individual judges on the
Federal Circuit vary widely and can be usefully divided into
three groups:  the Proceduralists, the Holistics, and the Swing
Judges.
5. Claim construction analysis at the Federal Circuit is clearly af-
fected by the composition of the panel that hears and decides
the case.
a. The participation (e.g., number of panel members) of
both Proceduralists and Holistics affects the claim con-
struction analysis, though in opposite ways.
b. One-half (6) of the currently active judges have statistically
significant individual effects on claim construction.
In the Sections that follow, we briefly discuss the implications of
these major findings, both in terms of the success of the Federal Cir-
cuit as an institution as well as the several policy recommendations
that are suggested by the results.
A.  Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding?
This study paints a decidedly mixed picture of the Federal Circuit.
Certainly, aspects of the results here support the view that the court is
not meeting its mandate for uniformity and predictability, especially
in the wake of Markman II.  The distinct and enduring split in meth-
odological approach, a trend of increasing polarity, and the associa-
tion between different claim construction analyses and the judges
themselves all provide ammunition to critics of the Federal Circuit’s
performance.  Other findings, however—the increasing dominance of
the procedural approach to claim construction, the increasing impor-
tance of the most consistent judges, and the changes wrought by re-
cent additions to the court—counsel against a one-dimensional view
of the Federal Circuit as a court in crisis.
An important perspective of the Federal Circuit offered through
the lens of this analysis is one of a court undergoing significant transi-
tion.  There seem to be two parallel mechanisms at work.  In the first,
the court seems to be attempting to respond to the mandate of
Markman II (and perhaps to the criticism of its early efforts).  This
can be seen in the “sharpening” of the expressed methodological ap-
proach in the jurisprudence, suggesting heightened awareness of the
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importance of analytic method and perhaps a related debate concern-
ing the appropriate methodological approach.  Moreover, a response
to Markman II might also be driving the trend of increasing proce-
duralism, representing the court’s gradual coalescence towards a
common methodological approach.  Such a “response” mechanism,
which implies a change in Federal Circuit jurisprudence, is consistent
with the sense that the doctrine is somewhat unstable, leading to rela-
tively high rates of reversal.
The second transformative mechanism at work in the Federal Cir-
cuit is even less subtle:  the findings of this study repeatedly emphasize
the importance of recent changes in court personnel.  Two of the
three most recent additions to the court, Judges Linn and Dyk, are
among the most procedural in methodological approach, are highly
likely to write “strong” expressions of methodological form, and rank
among the most consistent of all judges in the dataset.190  Indeed, this
pattern seems to be a generalized trend at the Federal Circuit, as Ta-
ble 8 indicates.
190
Note also that Judge Prost, whose small sample size necessitated her exclusion
from some interjudge analyses, appears to be heading in this same direction.
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Table 8:  The Changing Federal Circuit
Judge
Joined
Court
Procedural
(rank)
Consistency
(rank)
Status
Prost 2001 4 N/A active
Dyk 2000 1 1 active
Linn 2000 3 3 active
Gajarsa 1997 8 7 active
Bryson 1994 14 5 active
Schall 1992 11 8 active
Rader 1990 5 6 active
Clevenger 1990 2 2 active
Lourie 1990 13 11 active
Plager 1989 10 12 inactive
Michel 1988 6 4 active
Mayer 1987 7 14 active
Archer 1985 9 13 inactive
Newman 1984 15 9 active
Friedman 1978 16 N/A inactive
Rich 1956 12 10 N/A
Table 8 orders judges in the dataset by the reverse chronology in
which they joined the court (i.e., most recent appointments at the
top).  The junior judges appear to be generally more procedural and
more consistent than their more senior colleagues.191  An important
implication of Table 8 is that one might expect the trends identified
in Part III.B, such as the increasing use of a procedural methodo-
logical approach, to continue—and perhaps even amplify—into the
191
Indeed, a Gamma test of association, which indicates the direction and
strength of relationships between ordinal variables (such as those in Table 7) reveals a
statistically significant negative correlation between Joined Court and both the Proce-
dural (rank) and Consistency (rank) columns:
For Procedural (rank), γ = -0.362, p ≤ 0.05.
For Consistency (rank), γ = -0.425, p ≤ 0.01.
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future.192  In a significant way, we are watching the gradual emergence
of the “new” Federal Circuit, a development that is already having
profound effects on the court’s jurisprudence.
In our view, whether the Federal Circuit is succeeding is a ques-
tion that remains open.  Little in our results would lead one to con-
clude that the court has been an unqualified success in bringing
additional consistency, uniformity, and predictability to the patent
law.  Many findings, however, are unquestionably encouraging, sug-
gesting that the court’s effort to meet its mandate is both well under-
way and moving in the right direction.
B.  Policy Recommendations
The findings outlined above, we believe, suggest several policy
changes—both minor and major—that are likely to be beneficial to
the achievement of the Federal Circuit’s overall objectives.  We discuss
each of these briefly below.
1.  The Importance of Panel Composition Information
As a general matter, the Federal Circuit does not reveal the iden-
tity of the judges assigned to a particular case until oral argument.
Given our findings that the composition of panels affects the meth-
odological approach to claim construction, and thus the appellate re-
sults in many cases, this policy has important effects, both positive and
negative.193  On the negative side, keeping the panel membership a se-
cret until oral argument dramatically decreases the chances of settle-
ment while an appeal is pending; by the time that parties know of the
identity of the panel, all costs of the appeal (writing briefs, filing fees,
argument preparation, etc.) have been expended, removing perhaps
the primary impetus for settlement.  In contrast, a rule that allowed
parties to know panel membership months in advance would increase
both the time and the cost-incentives to settle the appeal.  We believe
the data in this Article offers important analytic tools for predicting
claim construction analyses at the Federal Circuit; such information is
likely to reduce the divergence between parties’ expectations and thus
192
The rate and consistency of these trends will (of course) depend greatly upon
future patterns of retirement and appointment to the Federal Circuit.  The data in Ta-
ble 7 suggest that those judges that are generally more holistic and less consistent are
closest to retirement.  There is the possibility that they could be replaced by judges
with similar profiles, but this would run counter to recent history.
193
Supra Part III.D.
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yield more settlements.194  More settlements means lower social costs
and frees the Federal Circuit to spend additional time on the more
difficult (less predictable) cases.  A policy change by the court to re-
lease panel composition as soon as possible would be a simple, cost-
free way for the court to increase the settlement rate.
On the other hand, there are (perhaps counterintuitive) jurispru-
dential benefits to the Federal Circuit’s current panel secrecy policy.
One important finding of this study is that while several members of
the Federal Circuit have relatively predictable effects on outcomes
when empanelled, about half of the court does not.195  This in turn
means that some panels will be more predictable than others—for ex-
ample, those with a majority of “swing” judges or a combination of all
three types.196  Given this understanding, one can predict that settle-
ment rates when panel composition is known will be unequally dis-
tributed, with less settlement of panels that are relatively less
predictable.197  This, then, has the potential of affecting the jurispru-
dence, with a larger proportion of opinions being decided by panels
(and written by judges) that are less predictable.  This, obviously,
could have long-term negative effects on the overall performance of
the court.
On balance, our view is that the jurisprudential concerns out-
weigh the social costs of less settlement, arguing at least weakly in fa-
vor of the current panel secrecy rule.198  Litigation is unquestionably
expensive, but for the Federal Circuit to best achieve its mandates of
clarity, consistency, and coherence, the loss of cost-reducing settle-
ment opportunities by obscuring panel composition seems to us to be
a cost that must be borne.
194
Cf. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 15-16 & fig.6 (1984) (depicting how expectations can affect the likeli-
hood of settlement).
195
Supra Table 5.
196
Supra Table 6 and Figure 8.
197
See Priest & Klein, supra note 194, at 15-16 (demonstrating the relationship be-
tween settlement rates and predictability).
198
One common defense of the panel secrecy rule is that it limits parties’ ability to
tailor arguments to the perceived preferences of individual judges/panels.  This is cer-
tainly true, though whether this is of substantial benefit is less clear; savvy advocates at
the Federal Circuit will (especially in the wake of this study) present both procedural
and holistic arguments in briefs and tailor their oral arguments more specifically.
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2.  Standardize (the Procedural) Methodological Approach
One of the major findings of this study—that there exists a distinct
(and enduring) split in the methodological approach to claim con-
struction at the Federal Circuit—suggests that the court could make
great strides in better meeting its mandate for uniformity and predict-
ability by standardizing one of the two methodologies identified.199
Indeed, as we noted in Part III.B.2, the current methodological split
on the Federal Circuit seems to be significantly related to reversals of
district court claim construction analyses.
Of the two methodological approaches identified in this study, the
procedural approach appears to be a far better choice, given the
court’s objectives.  In particular, our results find a relatively strong
and statistically significant relationship between a holistic methodo-
logical approach and variability (inconsistency), thereby implying that
the holistic approach is inherently more difficult for judges to apply in
a consistent and predictable manner.200  Further, while a complete ar-
ticulation of the advantages of the procedural approach are beyond
the scope of this Article, there are additional reasons to favor the pro-
cedural approach as well—especially the beneficial ex ante incentive
effects, which can be expected to encourage patent claiming strategies
that are both more clear and more direct, such as an increased use of
carefully defined terms.  As one of us has argued elsewhere, the ex
ante effects of patent law jurisprudence are highly important to the
overall operation of the patent administration system.201
3.  Taking Methodology Seriously
Even absent agreement among Federal Circuit judges concerning
the appropriate methodological approach to claim construction, our
findings suggest that methodology must be taken seriously, for it is an
element of the court’s mission to manage the patent law towards
greater uniformity and predictability.
Although there is some acknowledgement in the jurisprudence
that different approaches do exist, the court does not appear
to have meaningfully grappled with the implications of competing
199
An obvious mechanism for such standardization is en banc treatment of the
appropriate methodological approach to claim construction.
200
See infra Appendix A for details of this relationship.
201
See Wagner, supra note 80, at 167 (arguing for a shift from ex post to ex ante
analysis in patent law jurisprudence).
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methodological schemes.  Such concerns may be submerged beneath
a desire to, for example, reach essentially the “right” result with a
minimum of conflict—either within panels or between current and
prior opinions.  We note that the rate of alternative opinions was only
5.1%.  Given the approximately two-thirds/one-third methodological
split in the jurisprudence and the wide variance between the judges’
individual approaches,202 one would certainly expect more conflicts to
be observed within the cases themselves.203  One possible explanation
is that the judges on the Federal Circuit are simply unaware of the
importance of methodological approach and/or take at face value the
various jurisprudential efforts to “play down” distinctions in approach.
Yet the results here would suggest that an avoidance-of-differences
strategy, if it exists, has been unsuccessful at meaningfully avoiding
doctrinal instability.  Indeed, such plans radically diminish the prece-
dential and predictive value of the court’s opinions—that is, the use of
the court’s jurisprudence as a decision-making tool.  Efforts by the
court to “paper over” or “smooth out” the distinctions between the
two methodological approaches described here are likely to only in-
crease the overall variance of the claim construction results and
thereby further set back the court’s efforts to comply with its mandate.
In our view, the court should select from among these methodological
approaches (or develop a different one), and seek to apply it consis-
tently.
4.  Evangelism and Enforcement:  The Role of Individual Judges
The findings here reveal, unsurprisingly, that individual judges
play a significant role in the development of the Federal Circuit’s ju-
risprudence of claim construction.  Indeed, as discussed above, the
observed trends appear to be closely related to the impact of a small
number (two) of judges on the court in recent years.204  One recom-
mendation that flows from these observations is that evangelism and
enforcement activities by individual Federal Circuit judges should be
encouraged and embraced, whether such activities take the form of
dissenting opinions, internal discussions, or simply clearer statements
202
Supra Tables 4-5.
203
There could, of course, be a great deal of conflict among members of the court
on this issue that is never seen from the outside.
204
See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the impact of Judges Linn and Dyk).
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in the jurisprudence concerning methodology.205  As noted in Part
III.C, our data indicates only modest (visible) efforts on the Federal
Circuit in this regard—at least in this jurisprudential area.  But we are
hopeful that this could change; such leadership efforts on the part of
individual judges will not only benefit the court’s claim construction
precedents, but establish a normative construct that is likely to im-
prove the court’s performance with respect to its overall mandate.
5.  Seeking External Assistance:  The Role of the Supreme Court
The serious methodological split we identify in the Federal Cir-
cuit’s jurisprudence of claim construction raises the possibility, par-
ticularly in the absence of meaningful activities by the Federal Circuit
to resolve the issue internally, of intervention by the Supreme Court.206
Our own view is that the present situation, especially in light of the
observed trends, does not indicate an inability of the Federal Circuit
to deal with this question.  Nonetheless, recourse to the Supreme
Court is a well-understood avenue for resolving otherwise intractable
jurisprudential confusion.207
205
As Justice Scalia’s efforts with respect to statutory interpretation have illus-
trated, judges often act as enforcers of precedent and evangelists for particular ap-
proaches.  See, e.g., Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation:  Interpreting the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1161-62 (2002) (noting that Justice
Scalia will often “write[] separately—in cases where he agrees with the result reached
by the Court—to disassociate himself from the Court’s use of legislative history”); see
also William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 658 (1990)
(noting that the Supreme Court has made an effort to downplay the role of legislative
history in its decisions).
206
The Supreme Court’s recent history of intervention in Federal Circuit doctrine
shows an increased willingness to get involved when internal disputes appear deep.
For example, see Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki, Co., 535 U.S. 722, 740-
42 (2002); Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40-41 (1997);
Markman II, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
207
The history surrounding the Supreme Court’s Chevron decision, Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), which was similarly charac-
terized by distinct doctrinal splits and implications for institutional arrangements and
design, is one example.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2079 (1990) (describing the tension between administrative
agencies and the judiciary before Chevron).  For additional discussion of the impact of
Chevron on the courts’ approach to reviewing agency decision making, see Antonin
Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517;
Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review in Midpassage:  The Uneasy Partnership Between Courts and
Agencies Plays On, 32 TULSA L.J. 221, 241 (1996); Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law,
Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692, 1717-
20 (2001).
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CONCLUSION
As an appellate body jurisdictionally demarcated by subject matter
rather than geography, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit occupies a unique role in the federal judiciary.  This
controversial institutional design has had profound effects on the ju-
risprudential development of the legal regimes within its ambit—es-
pecially patent law, which the Federal Circuit has come to thoroughly
dominate during its two decades of existence.
In our view, whether the Federal Circuit is succeeding is a question
which remains open.  Little in the results above would lead one to
conclude that the court has been an unqualified success in bringing
additional consistency, uniformity, and predictability to patent law.
But at the same time, many findings are unquestionably encouraging,
suggesting that the court’s effort to meet its mandate is both well un-
derway and moving in the right direction.  The picture of the Federal
Circuit that emerges, we submit, is of a court in broad transition.
Driven in part by new appointments and an effort to respond to its
special mandate, a new Federal Circuit is emerging—one that appears
to be more rules-driven and more consistent than before.  It is too
early to be sure, but the findings here, perhaps bolstered by the pro-
cedural and jurisprudential reforms we derive from the results, sug-
gest that the Federal Circuit’s unique position in the judiciary may yet
be vindicated.
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APPENDIX A:  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN METHODOLOGY
AND (IN)CONSISTENCY
The following chart plots the methodological approach and vari-
ability of each judge in the dataset using authorship data.
For the trendline, R2 = .523, p ≤ .005, indicating a somewhat strong,
statistically significant relationship.
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